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ABSTRACT
Model Checking Trust-based Multi-Agent Systems
Nagat Drawel, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2019
Trust has been the focus of many research projects, both theoretical and practical, in
the recent years, particularly in domains where open multi-agent technologies are applied
(e.g., Internet-based markets, Information retrieval, etc.). The importance of trust in such
domains arises mainly because it provides a social control that regulates the relationships
and interactions among agents. Despite the growing number of various multi-agent appli-
cations, they still encounter many challenges in their formal modeling and the verification
of agents’ behaviors. Many formalisms and approaches that facilitate the specifications of
trust in Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) can be found in the literature. However, most of these
approaches focus on the cognitive side of trust where the trusting entity is normally capable
of exhibiting properties about beliefs, desires, and intentions. Hence, the trust is considered
as a belief of an agent (the truster) involving ability and willingness of the trustee to per-
form some actions for the truster. Nevertheless, in open MASs, entities can join and leave
the interactions at any time. This means MASs will actually provide no guarantee about the
behavior of their agents, which makes the capability of reasoning about trust and checking
the existence of untrusted computations highly desired.
This thesis aims to address the problem of modeling and verifying at design time
trust in MASs by (1) considering a cognitive-independent view of trust where trust ingre-
dients are seen from a non-epistemic angle, (2) introducing a logical language named Trust
Computation Tree Logic (TCTL), which extends CTL with preconditional, conditional, and
iii
graded trust operators along with a set of reasoning postulates in order to explore its capa-
bilities, (3) proposing a new accessibility relation which is needed to define the semantics
of the trust modal operators. This accessibility relation is defined so that it captures the
intuition of trust while being easily computable, (4) investigating the most intuitive and
efficient algorithm for computing the trust set by developing, implementing, and experi-
menting different model checking techniques in order to compare between them in terms of
memory consumption, efficiency, and scalability with regard to the number of considered
agents, (5) evaluating the performance of the model checking techniques by analyzing the
time and space complexity.
The approach has been applied to different application domains to evaluate its com-
putational performance and scalability. The obtained results reveal the effectiveness of the
proposed approach, making it a promising methodology in practice.
iv
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In this chapter, we introduce the context of our research and motivations. Then, we identify
the methodology, research questions, and contributions of our work. Finally, we conclude
this chapter by providing the thesis organization.
1.1 Context of Research
1.1.1 Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Agents are autonomous entities that have reactive, pro-active, social and rational properties.
Reactive property means that an agent is capable of responding to external changes in its en-
vironment. Pro-active property refers to its ability to behave with respect to its goals. Social
property is an agent’s capability to interact and communicate with other agents, and ratio-
nality property is an agent’s ability to act consistently with its goals [109]. A Multi-Agent
System (MAS) composed of multiple agents, which interact in dynamic and uncertain envi-
ronments in order to achieve their goals [110]. Agents may be heterogeneous, which means
that they may have different preferences and behaviours, and they may be independently
1
developed by different programmers. The ability of agents to communicate and interact
with one another is one of their essential properties. Interaction among autonomous and
heterogeneous agents is the key aspect for: 1) solving complex problems that an individual
agent cannot handle alone, and 2) building effective MASs. These appealing features made
MASs successfully adopted in a large number of critical applications such as commercial,
industrial, governmental and healthcare systems [12, 111, 107, 58]. Nonetheless, this adop-
tion raises a number of challenges related to their present and future behaviors. The fact that
agents are autonomous and have to interact with each other within unreliable environments
makes the concept of trust of particular importance for regulating their interactions.
1.1.2 Trust in Multi-Agent Systems
Trust is regarded as being one of the key aspects behind the success and growth of applica-
tions based on MASs. Trust has been an essential research topic in several disciplines for
many years. Each of these disciplines gives different definitions for trust [63, 65, 46, 105].
For instance, in the field of distributed computing, trust is used mainly to regulate the re-
lationship between service providers and customers [105, 1]. In social science disciplines,
trust is seen as a relationship among individuals in social settings [46] (e.g., trust is used to
control relationships between trusters and trustees to ensure that the trustees will perform a
certain action).
In the context of MASs, the most widely used definition is the one proposed by
Castelfranchi and Falcone (abbreviated as C&F) [16], where trust is basically defined as
a mental state of one agent (the truster) towards another agent (the trustee) in which the
truster’s goals and beliefs are reflected in some internal properties of the trustee. C&F stud-
ied the trust concept in a cognitive perspective that emphasizes the importance of the goal
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component. Such a component allows us to distinguish trust from mere thinking and fore-
seeing [48]. Indeed, by emphasizing the agent’s goal, C&F rely on the internal structures
of agents for the fulfillment of their own goals. Since these systems involve autonomous
entities that keep their structure private, it is hard to verify if the agents’ goals are achieved.
To cope with this limitation, we take in this research a new approach towards social per-
spectives of trust where the trust parties do not have intuition for cognitive goals. Instead,
we define trust from a high-level abstraction without having to depend on individual agent’s
internal mental states.
Trust in multi agent systems has been analyzed from different aspects. The major
studies focused on two main approaches: the numerical approach and the logical approach.
The numerical direction treats trust as a function that is calculated based on multiple opin-
ions through feedback, user ratings, or agent monitoring [106, 17, 82, 94]. Such approaches
represent and quantify the strength level in which an agent trusts another party. Specifically,
the higher an agent trusts another agent, the more likely the latter would be chosen as an
interaction partner. Trust was first introduced as a measurable notation of an entity in [77].
Following this work, a number of computational models have been proposed in the MASs
literature (see for instance [90]). Nevertheless, in dynamic MASs where agents may join
for a short period of time before leaving the interaction, it might be impossible to collect
sufficient information to evaluate the trustworthiness of partners. As a consequence, the
well established trust relationships is not guaranteed due to misleading trust results. On the
other hand, the logical approach mainly focuses on defining semantic structures for trust.
Several logical frameworks have been proposed to describe the static and dynamic proper-
ties of trust. Such approaches provide a formal semantics to reason about trust properties in
various applications such as security protocols, information sources, and recommendation
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systems. Moreover, in terms of expressiveness, some of these studies adopted combin-
ing logics [3, 68], while others extended standard logics of action and belief, or enriched
temporal logics with a new modality for trust [27, 48, 98].
1.1.3 Verification of Trust in MASs
Generally, verifying that a system complies with its design requirements is very challeng-
ing, especially in multi-agent systems. The existence of many autonomous entities in such
systems makes the verification highly difficult due to the increase in their complexity and
heterogeneity. The main challenge that faces MASs is how to ensure the reliability of the
trust relationships in the presence of misbehaving entities. Such entities not only create an
exception for other agents, but also may obstruct their proper work [55]. The fact that such
agents are autonomous and have to interact with each other within unreliable environments
makes reasoning about trust and checking the existence of untrusted computations highly
desired.
Technically, the verification mechanisms of trust in MASs fall into two categories de-
pending on when the verification activities are performed: runtime and design-time. For the
first approaches, monitoring is the most common used technique where the verification is
performed by monitoring the evolving executions of the target system during the operation
phase, and then checking whether the desired properties of the system hold or not [4, 6, 8].
Runtime verification can also extract relevant information from a running system and use
it to detect undesired behaviors with regard to particular properties. On the other hand,
the second approaches rely on the static formal verification, which is a class of logic-based
techniques. In such approaches, model checking has become one of the most successful
approaches widely used for verifying various aspects of MASs [9, 71, 108]. Indeed, each
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technique has its own advantages and limitations. For instance, one of the appealing fea-
tures of the runtime verification is the use of real and concrete runs to check the correctness
of the target system. This allows us not only to observe the real system, but also react
whenever undesired behaviors are detected [66]. However, such techniques only consider
a particular execution of the system, which may lead to an incomplete verification process
due to the limited coverage. In contrast, the design phase techniques systematically check
all possible states of the system, provide full automation of the verification process, and
can produce counter examples when the system fails to satisfy a desired property. Yet, such
techniques suffer from the state explosion problem that limits the applicability of verifying
large systems. Technically, both techniques complement each other in detecting untrust-
worthy behaviors and improving MASs development.
In fact, although trust is dynamic because agents can change their behaviors dynami-
cally, still verifying trust properties at design time is very critical and useful. Model check-
ing trust is of prime importance to ensure that trust behavior can take place among agents
engaged in an interaction. For instance, if the outcome of the model checking reveals there
is no execution where a particular trust property is satisfied, then this could be considered
as a final verdict and the model should be changed because it is unsafe to deploy it in real
systems. On the other hand, if the model checking reveals the opposite, which means all
possible executions are trusted, then showing the equivalence between the implemented
model and the designed one would be enough, if such an equivalence is possible to be
proven. In the general case where the outcome reveals that some paths are trusted and
some others are not, then model checking will benefit the dynamic verification that could
be guided to monitor the untrusted paths, which means monitor if the agents are behaving
according to the identified untrusted paths. Though, in this thesis, we adopt a design time
approach as our main goal is to improve the utilization of MASs paradigm by reducing
5
the time and cost of the development process, and to increase the confidence on the safety,
efficiency and robustness of the system. Recently, formal evaluation using model checking
techniques has been proved to be a highly effective tool [20, 21].
1.2 Motivations
In this research, we are primarily concerned with the issues of reasoning about and verifying
trust in the context of MASs using the model checking approach, which has not been deeply
investigated yet for trust systems. In the literature, many logical formalism approaches of
trust in MASs can be found. However, very few approaches addressed trust from a high
level abstraction viewpoint [98]. Modal logic approaches provide powerful mechanisms
that can be effectively used for trust reasoning. Such approaches yield a formal semantics
to reason about trust properties in various applications such as security protocols, infor-
mation sources, and e-markets. For instance, in [24, 48, 75], the authors proposed several
logical frameworks for the concept of trust. Trust in such logics is mostly expressed as
a combination of different modalities based on the logic of action and time [47] and the
BDI logic [22]. In [69], a modal logic for reasoning about the interaction between belief,
evidence and trust is presented. Other approaches are interested in analyzing trust in in-
formation sources [5, 24, 27, 67]. Moreover, some proposals have addressed trust in the
context of computer security [45, 75].
Most of these approaches focus on the cognitive side of trust (i.e., trusted agents are
capable of exhibiting beliefs, desires, and intentions properties). Hence, the trust is consid-
ered as a belief of an agent (the truster) involving ability and willingness of the trustee to
perform some actions for the truster. Since these agents are autonomous and heterogeneous,
such a mental concept cannot make those agents abide by the language semantics whenever
they interact [9]. Thus, the need for a logical language that can provide a certain level of
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abstraction with the ability to express the trust properties is of great significance. More-
over, agents are able to show flexible and unpredictable behaviour when they are working
together in an unreliable environment. Hence, deciding whether to trust other agents (for
instance to perform some actions) or not is a challenging task. For instance, agents may
not comply with their obligations (e.g., an agent may not send the payment for goods re-
ceived). Thus, this raises the need for developing efficient methodologies to handle their
present and future behaviors in order to ensure the fulfillment of the system requirements.
Currently, the technique of model checking [20, 21] has attracted several contributions with
a significant industrial implication. Although these contributions addressed a number of
multi-agent aspects such as social commitments [9, 33] and knowledge [73, 104], model
checking trust in multi-agent settings has not been sufficiently investigated yet. From this
view, we aim in this research to contribute in the modeling and verification of trust systems.
To motivate our study of analyzing the trust in MASs, we use an example in the con-
text of electronic commerce where trust is a highly desired property. Let us consider the
buyers-sellers relationships. The buyer requests to purchase one or more items from the
seller (i.e., the trust relationship is established between the two parties). Once the former
selects an item, and the requested items are paid. The seller confirms the order and starts the
delivery process. Finally, the requested items are shipped and the buyer is notified. How-
ever, online interactions are characterized by uncertainty and, moreover, the anonymity of
the interaction partners. Thus, there is no guarantee that this process will be surely satis-
fied in concrete applications. Therefore, the need for formally specifying and automatically
verifying trust-based interactions among autonomous agents are of great importance.
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1.3 Methodology and Research Questions
Our review of the concept of trust in the context of MASs literature has revealed a gap in
modeling trust from social perspectives point of view. The existing approaches consider a
cognitive concept of trust where trust is defined as an attitude of the truster who believes
that the trustee has a given property. Although these approaches are highly appropriate
to reason about trust, their verification faces a fundamental limitation due to their reliance
on the internal structure of the interacting agents. In fact, the distributed and open na-
ture of MASs makes the capability of handling and verifying the trust interaction issues
of such approaches arduous. That is, the challenge of automatically detecting the undesir-
able behaviors of such agents’ and then fixing them according to preset specifications is
an important issue that arises in the cognitive semantic approaches. Another issue that has
attracted our attention while reviewing the literature is the limitation of the approaches that
addressed the model checking problem of trust logics. The current proposals have been
focusing mainly on evaluating the trust-based systems. Such approaches often evaluate the
effectiveness and robustness of these models against undesired attackers’ behaviors. While
these approaches have the advantage of detecting and isolating different kinds of attacks,
they lack the generality (i.e., the proposed assessment tools can only be applied to a single
particular model). Moreover, only known and predefined attacks have been considered in
the evaluation process. Besides, theses approaches are not designed to formalize and ver-
ify trust for autonomous MASs. Nonetheless, interacting agents are heterogeneous, which
means one cannot guarantee that they will behave as they are supposed to. Thus, the need
for efficient methodologies to automatically check whether or not MASs behavior conforms
with the system specifications is recognized. So far, there is almost no approach on verify-
ing statically MASs with respect to certain properties related to agents trust. Dealing with
such an issue as a model checking problem is one of our goals in this research. In order to
8
do so, different important research questions arise:
Question 1. How can we define a temporal logic that is capable of specifying the trust
properties from social perspectives viewpoint?
To address this question, we started by investigating the possibility of using the exist-
ing temporal logics such as LTL [91] and CTL [43]. However, we realized that the needed
modality for trust cannot be expressed using such logics. In fact, these logics lack the
capabilities to model trust interactions and the dynamic behaviors of autonomous agents.
Therefore, we propose to extend CTL logic with a trust operator to represent and reason
about the properties that an agent requires to be achieved by the trusted agent. The main
reasons that encouraged us to extend CTL logic are: (1) CTL logic has grounded semantics,
which means it can be associated to computational models, (2) there are several open model
checker tools that support this logic, and (3) such logic has a high efficient model checking
procedure.
Moreover, we associate with the logic a set of reasoning rules along with their formal
proofs to capture the common reasoning patterns that uniformly apply to trust relationships
and agents are expected to respect them when they engage in interactions.
From the semantics perspectives, we define a new trust accessibility relation to cap-
ture the trust relationship between the interacting agents by extending the original frame-
work of interpreted systems [44]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first ini-
tiative that gives formal and computational definitions of the trust accessibility relation as a
social concept between interacting agents in MASs. Given that, the direct question is:
Question 2. How can we formally verify the developed temporal logic?.
In order to reduce and eliminate post-development costs and increase confidence on
the safety, efficiency and robustness, two verification techniques at design time have been
9
put forward to verify trust logic: direct and indirect verification techniques. A direct method
can be performed by either developing a proper model checker from scratch or by extending
existing tools with new algorithms for the needed temporal modalities. In contrast, indirect
techniques, also called transformation-based methods, can be performed by applying cer-
tain reduction rules in order to transform the problem at hand to an existing model checking
problem. In this research, we aim to explore both techniques in order to compare between
them in terms of memory consumption, efficiency, and scalability with regard to the number
of considered agents. Knowing all these facts, our next research question:
Question 3. How can we evaluate the proposed solution for the model checking prob-
lem of the developed temporal logic?
Two evaluation methods have been put forward: Empirical and Theoretical. The first
method is evaluated by applying the proposed algorithms in real world case studies and
report the experimental results, and the second method is to explore the theoretical analysis
by analyzing the time and space complexity. By the end, a key question that need to be
asked is how much should we trust?
Question 4. How the degree of trust that an agent has toward anther agent can be
computed and verified?
Trust in the existing approaches has often been treated as either true or false, i.e., we
either trust the behavior of an agent or not. However, such systems have also quantitative
temporal properties (such as degrees of trust), which still need further attention from the
logical and model checking perspectives. In fact, in many contexts, it is quite difficult to
determine with absolute certainty whether a proposition about the behaviours of potential
agents is true or false. For instance, I might trust the agent to a certain degree in relation to
given propositions (i.e., I may have only 50% of trust). In our research, we aim to address
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this issue by introducing a logical-based framework for quantifying the relationships among
the interacting agents.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the research methodology w.r.t the identified research ques-
tions and maps them to thesis chapters.
1.4 Contributions
The following contributions are offered by this thesis:
– We introduced the Trust Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) that extended the standard
CTL logic with a new temporal modality to represent and reason about preconditional
trust, and then defined its formal semantics. We also associated the logic with a set
of reasoning rules along with their formal proofs.
– We introduced a new vector-extended version of interpreted systems to capture the
trust relationship between the interacting agents.
– We designed a new symbolic model checking algorithm to formally and automatically
verify the system under consideration against some desirable properties expressed
using the proposed logic. We fully implemented our proposed algorithms by extended
the MCMAS model checker for MASs. Hence, a new model checker tool, called
MCMAS-T, dedicated to TCTL, along with its new input language VISPL (Vector-
extended ISPL) have been introduced.
– We expressed the concept of conditional trust by extending TCTL, the extended logic
is called TCTLC. Then, we developed a new model checking framework for the
TCTL logic of preconditional trust that is extended to design a new algorithm to
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model check conditional trust TCTLC. In particular, we introduced transformation-
based algorithms and implemented them in a Java toolkit that automatically interacts
with the NuSMV model checker of the CTL logic.
– We introduced a logical language called TCTLG, an extension of TCTL that allows
us to formally represent and reason about the quantitative aspect of trust. Moreover,
a dedicated symbolic model checking algorithm for TCTLG implemented on top of
MCMAS is presented (MCMAS-G).
– We computed the time and space complexity of the model checking problem of the
developed temporal logics. We proved that the time complexity of TCTL, TCTLC,
and TCTLG model checking algorithms in explicit models is P-complete with regard
to the size of the model and length of the formula, and the complexity of the same
problems for concurrent programs is PSPACE-complete with respect to the size of
the program’s components.
– We successfully applied the proposed logic and tools to model check different appli-
cation domains.
1.5 Thesis Structure
We present in Chapter 2 the background needed to understand the different concepts of our
research work. In particular, we give an overview of the CTL logic, summarize the formal-
ism of interpreted systems, and review the model checking techniques. Then, we provide
literature reviews on the main approaches on trust modeling. We compare the existing ap-
proaches with regard to the proposed criteria and highlight some potential research gaps
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Figure 1.1: Research methodology w.r.t the identified research questions
In Chapter 3, we present the syntax and semantics of the developed TCTL logic. A set of
reasoning rules are also presented. To verify the trust interactions, new model checking al-
gorithms dedicated to TCTL logic are introduced. We also present the full implementation
of our algorithms on top of the MCMAS symbolic model checker. Our implementation
extends the input language of MCMAS in order to parse the TCTL logic syntax and se-
mantics. Thereafter, we evaluate the tool and report experimental results using a real-life
scenario in the healthcare platform.
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In Chapter 4, we investigate a different model checking technique for TCTL logic. More-
over, we extend TCTL logic by introducing a new modality for conditional trust to pro-
duce a new logic called TCTLC. In this chapter, the problem of model checking TCTL
is transformed to the problem of model checking CTL by means of transformation-based
algorithms that are extended to design a new algorithm to model check conditional trust
TCTLC. The algorithms are implemented in a Java toolkit that automatically interacts with
the NuSMV model checker of the CTL logic. Further, we analyze the time complexity of
TCTL model checking in explicit models and its space complexity in concurrent programs.
Moreover, we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach by performing a set
of experiments on a widely-used case study in business domain and compare our results
with the results obtained in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 5, we address the quantitative aspect of trust from the modeling and verification
perspectives. We start by constructing TCTLG, a logical language to represent the degrees
of trust along with its reasoning postulates. Moreover, a new symbolic model checking
algorithm for quantifying the relationships among the interacting agents is presented. The
implementation of the model checker MCMAS-G, an extended version of the MCMAS
model checker is introduced. Moreover, we investigate the complexity and evaluate our
approach using a case study in the health care domain.
We summarize the obtained results and sketch possible extension of this work in Chapter 6
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
In this chapter, we briefly present some preliminaries needed for the rest of the thesis. In
Section 2.1, we explore Computation Tree Logic (CTL) as the main ingredient that we used
to define a formal semantics for trust in our proposed approach. Section 2.2 is devoted to
briefly review the formalism of interpreted systems, which provides a very popular frame-
work for modeling and reasoning about MASs. In Section 2.3, we provide the relevant
background of symbolic model checking techniques and tools. Thereafter, in Section 2.4,
we discuss relevant related work on current logical-based frameworks in trust-based MASs.
We explain each proposal and point out if it meets the introduced criteria. Finally, we high-
light the main features of our proposed framework and present some potential research
gaps.
2.1 Computation Tree Logic - CTL
CTL [43] logic is a branching time logic with modal operators to describe the temporal
order of events. The CTL represents a tree-like structure time where each moment in time
may split into many possible paths in future.
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Definition 2.1. (Syntax of CTL)
The syntax of CTL formulae is defined as follows:
f ::= r j :j j j _j j EXj jEGj j E(jUj)
where r 2 AP is an atomic proposition from the set of atomic propositions AP, E is the
existential quantifier over paths, the formula EXj stands for "j holds in the next state in
at least one path", EGj stands for "there exists a path in which j holds globally", and the
formula E(jUy) holds at the current state if there is some future moment for which y
holds and j holds at all moments until that future moment. EFj is the abbreviation of
E(trueUj). A, the universal quantifier over paths, can be defined in terms of the above
as usual: AXj = :EX:j; AGj = :EF:j; and A(jUy) = :(E(:yU(:j ^:y))_
EG:y).
The semantics of CTL formulae is given in terms of a transition system M=(S;R;V; I)
where S is a nonempty set of states, R SS is a transition relation, V : S! 2AP is a valu-
ation function, and I  S is a set of initial states. The transition relation R models temporal
transitions among states: given two states s;s0 2 S, (s;s0) 2 R means that s0 is an immedi-
ate successor of s. The behaviour of the system model M is a set of computation paths.
A path p in a model M from a state s0 is an infinite sequence of reachable global states
p = s0s1s2    such that for all i 0 ,(si;s(i+1)) 2 R.
Definition 2.2. (Satisfaction)
Given the model M, the satisfaction for a CTL formula j in a global state s, denoted
as (M;s) j= j , is recursively defined as follows:
 (M;s) j= r iff r 2V (s);
 (M;s) j= :j iff (M;s) 2 j;
 (M;s) j= j1_j2 iff (M;s) j= j1 or (M;s) j= j2;
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 (M;s) j= EXj iff there exists a path p starting at s such that (M;p(1)) j= j;
 (M;s) j= EGj iff there exists a path p starting at s such that (M;p(k)) j= j;8k 0;
 (M;s) j=E(j1Uj2) iff there exists a path p starting at s for some k 0;(M;p(k)) j=
j2 and 8 0 i < k; (M;p(i)) j= j1;
2.2 Interpreted Systems
An interpreted system [44] is a formal description that has been proven to be a suitable for-
malism for reasoning about knowledge and time in MASs, and which systematically models
different classes of MASs, such as synchronous and asynchronous. Such a formalism en-
joys a high level of abstraction that allows focusing only on the interactions among the
various agents, and it is a useful tool for modeling autonomous and heterogeneous agents
interacting within a global system. The original version of interpreted systems has been
extended in various ways. For instance, Bentahar et al. [10] and El-Menshawy et al. [39]
extended the formalism of interpreted systems with sets of shared and unshared variables
to account for agent communications that occur during the execution of MASs.
Here, we present the standard semantics of interpreted systems as in [44]. Consider
a set Agt = f1;   ;ng of n agents and at any given time, each agent in the system is in
a particular local state, which represents the complete information about the system that
the agent can access at that time. Each agent i 2 Agt is associated with a non-empty set
of local states Li and a set of local actions Acti to model the temporal evolution of the
system together with a local protocol ri : Li! 2Acti assigning a list of enabled actions to a
given local state li 2 Li. It is assumed that null 2 Acti for each agent i, where null refers
to the silent action (the fact of doing nothing). A local evolution function ti is defined as:
ti : LiActi! Li, which determines the transitions for an individual agent i between her
local states.
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As in [44], a global state s 2 S represents a snapshot of all agents in the system
at a given time. A global state s is a tuple s = (l1; : : : ; ln). The set of all global states
S  L1 : : : Ln is a non-empty subset of the Cartesian product of all local states of n
agents. The notation li(s) is used to represent the local state of agent i in the global state
s. I  S is a set of initial global states for the system. The global evolution function of the
system is defined as follows: t : SACT  ! S, where ACT = Act1 : : :Actn and each
component a2 ACT is called a joint action, which is a tuple of actions. As in [44], a special
agent e is used to model the environment in which the agents operate. The environment e is
modeled using a set of local states Le, a set of actions Acte, a protocol Pe, and an evolution
function te.
2.3 Symbolic Model Checking Technique
The technique of model checking [20, 21] is used in both software and hardware industries
since the 1980’s. The goal of model checking is to verify the system correctness against
desired properties at design time.The system is modeled as a finite-state transition system
and the properties (the specifications) of the system that need to be verified are formulated
in temporal logics, and then it is systematically checked whether the specifications are met
for a given system (the model). If they are not met, a counterexample is produced which
provides a helpful tool for debugging the system design. Many verification tools are devel-
oped for this purpose such as SPIN [50], NuSMV [19], MCMAS [73], and PRISM [62].
SPIN is an automaton-based model checker for Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) focusing on
proving the correctness of process interactions. NuSMV is an extended version of Symbolic
Model Verifier (SMV) [79] that allows checking finite state systems against specifications
in both Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). MCMAS [72] is
a model checker for multi-agent systems which can verify a variety of properties specified
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by different logics such as CTL, Computation Tree Logic of social Commitments (CTLC),
and Computation Tree Logic of Knowledge (CTLK). The dedicated programming language
used for describing a MAS in MCMAS is called ISPL (Interpreted Systems Programming
Language). The PRISM tool [62] is widely used for checking probabilistic specifications
over probabilistic model. The specifications can be expressed either in the Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) or in the Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL).
Formally, let M be a state-transition graph (the system model), and j be the property
that the model has to satisfy. Then, the model checking technique is used to check whether
or not the model M representing the system satisfies the logical formula j describing a
certain property.
Recently, model checking has been extended to MASs. Different approaches have
been proposed to extend model checking techniques with the aim of verifying extended
temporal logics with agent-related modalities. For instance, verifying epistemic proper-
ties expressed using logics of knowledge [70, 71, 89, 59], conditional and unconditional
commitments [10, 41, 40, 33] and services composition [7, 34].
The main challenge in the application of model checking is the state space explosion
problem. Early implementation of model checking algorithms suffered from this problem,
which occurs when the number of components in the system grows up to the degree that
makes the number of global states enormous. However, researchers have made consider-
able progress in dealing with this problem over the last three decades. The introduction
of Symbolic Model Checking with Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) data structure [14],
Bounded Model Checking (BMC), Partial Order Reduction, and Symmetry Reduction tech-
niques succeeded in partially combating this problem. Yet, these methods still suffer from
the potential memory explosion problem on modern test cases. In this thesis, we adapt
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Figure 2.1: A model checker with counter and witness examples
mitigating the state explosion problem. Symbolic model checking considers the set of states
(denoted as [[f ]]) satisfying the given formula f in the model M, which is represented and
manipulated using Ordered Binary Decision Diagram (OBDD)[13] data structure. Such a
set is then compared against the set of initial states I in the model M (also represented as an
OBDD). Thus, we say that a model M satisfies the formula f if and only if I  [[f ]]. In a
formal way, this fact can be represented as (M; I) j= f iff (M;s) j= f 8 s 2 I.
Figure 2.1 describes a typically model checking process that involves three integrated
phases. First, the system design formulated in some precise mathematical language. Then,
specifications about the system are expressed as temporal logic formulas. Finally, the ver-




In this section, we present our methodological review where we classify the current state-of-
the-art in the domain of trust in MASs in three parts: qualitative logical-based approaches,
quantitative logical-based approaches, and model checking trust-based techniques. In the
following, we present a brief overview of each of these constituents and highlight the advan-
tages and limitations of existing approaches and the main features of our proposed frame-
work.
2.4.1 Qualitative Logical-based Approaches
Modal logics have been used to formalize trust in MASs by many researchers. Most of
the existing formal approaches consider trust based on key aspects of cognitive view where
trust involves four components: truster, trustee, action of the trustee, and goal of the truster.
In particular, [24] has proposed several approaches for trust reasoning. He developed a
logic by combining a dynamic logic [47] with the BDI logic [22]. Trust in this work is
considered as an attitude of the truster who believes that the trustee has a given property.
In other proposals, Demolombe, Lorini and Amgoud have focused on analyzing trust in
various features of information sources [27, 75]. For instance, in [75], the authors formalize
some security properties and their relationships with trust such as integrity, availability and
privacy by introducing a modal operator of obligation. Thus, one agent is trusting another
agent if the former believes that the information transmitted to it is reliable.
Similarly, trust in the domain of information sources is proposed in early work [67]
where the BIT, a modal logic that extends the traditional doxastic logic with modalities for
representing belief, information acquisition, and trust is presented. In the BIT formalism,
the trust operator is interpreted using neighborhood semantics [80]. The logic is provided
with a rigorous semantics to precisely characterize 1) the relationships among beliefs and
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information acquisition, and 2) how different trust properties are represented by consider-
ing various axioms of the logic. Indeed, this well-known, early formal treatment of trust,
has been followed by many researchers. For instance, [87] has simplified the semantical
treatment of the trust operator given in [67] by retaining only two types of modalities, a
belief operator and trust, and they do not make use of the additional information operator.
The idea of this work is to concentrate only on the interrelation between trust and belief.
Their alternative logic of trust can also explicate a type of trust that is linked to honesty
or sincerity. It allows to consider different forms of honesty separately and to incorpo-
rate these already into the base logic. Trust in the sincerity is also presented recently in
[18]. The authors proposed a modal logic to reason about an agent’s trust in the sincerity
towards a statement formulated by another agent. In this work, trust is represented as a nor-
mal modality that allows to reason about trust when an agent attempt to manipulate other
agents. Moreover, the authors exhibited some notable properties such as non-transitivity of
trust, and they proved the soundness and completeness of the proposed logic.
Following the path of cognitive trust, [48] proposed a formal logical framework to
evaluate agents’ behavior in a multi-agent environment. To do so, they presented a lan-
guage that combines the expressiveness of the logic of time, the logic of action, and the
logic of beliefs. Moreover, the proposed logic is extended in order to enable reasoning
about reputation. Trust in their work is based on the basic concept of belief while the repu-
tation is considered in the scope of collective beliefs. They distinguish between two general
categories of trust: occurrent trust and dispositional trust, and they provided precise defi-
nitions and formal representations for the two concepts. In another work [49], Herzig and
his colleagues simplified the previous logic presented in [48] by considering a very simple
kind of actions based on the concepts of propositional assignment. That is, the truth values
of a propositional variable is assigned to either true or false by the corresponding agents’
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actions. The new logic provides a simple framework, and it is expressive enough to account
for the cognitive theory of trust. In [69], Liu and Lorini presented a new dynamic logic
called DL-BET for reasoning about the interaction between belief, evidence and trust. The
authors introduced three modal operators where each of these concepts are respectively
represented. In this logic, the trust operator semantics is interpreted using neighborhood
semantics [80], which maps each world into a set of subsets of worlds. The authors pro-
vided a complete axiomatization for both the static component of the proposed logic and
its dynamic extension. Another logic-based proposal for trust has been initiated by [15]
who introduced a logic of trust called BAN-logic used for reasoning about the correctness
of security protocols. The authors translated the protocol steps as logical formulas in order
to manipulate them using first-order logic. Fuchs and colleagues [45] also addressed trust
in the context of computer security. Moreover, more recent proposals have made the link
between trust and argument-based frameworks [85, 101].
The closest approach to our work is the one presented by Singh in [98] where the
social perspective of trust has been put forward. Specifically, the author provided a for-
mal semantics for trust with various logical postulates used to reason about trust from an
architectural perspective. His model is based on the idea of trust as a dependence. This
model combines temporal modalities of linear temporal logic (LTL) [91] and modality (C)
for commitments [97] and (T ) modality for trust. The semantics is interpreted using neigh-
borhood semantics [80], which maps each world into a set of subsets of worlds. A function
| that produces a set of propositions for each moment, an ordered pair of two agents, and
a proposition is defined. This function yields a set of consequent propositions, which in
turn captures what the truster would be trusted to if the antecedent holds. Thus, the trust
semantics is defined by computing the set of moments where the consequence holds and
testing if those moments are among the moments computed by | on the trust antecedent.
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Yet, it is not clear how the function | is computed, which makes the approach quite difficult
to be applied in practice.
While the aforementioned approaches have taken a good step towards developing a
modal logic for trust, they fail to present the notion of trust explicitly. Moreover, such
studies are mostly focused on agents with mental states where the trusting entity is normally
capable of exhibiting beliefs, desires, and intentions. Nevertheless, agents are operating in
open environments. Thus, they are likely using different types of platforms and are possibly
using different technologies, so it is very difficult for one agent to completely trust others
or to make assumptions about their internal states. Besides, such logics are abstract and
not computationally-grounded (i.e., we cannot interpret them using concrete computational
models), which makes them hard to be applicable for verification purposes. Moreover,
model checking neighborhood semantics-based modal logics is yet to be solved [38, 84].
2.4.2 Quantitative Logical-based Approaches
Indeed, there are relatively small amounts of directly related work. For instance, the work
in [26, 5] proposed several approaches that address the graded trust. They developed a
logic by combining a dynamic logic [47] with a BDI-like logic [22]. The author in [25]
defined a logical framework to represent graded trust in terms of two independent com-
ponents: graded beliefs and graded regularities. In this work, trust is reduced to graded
beliefs, so the graded trust is defined as the strength level of the truster agent belief about
the trustee agent sincerity. In another proposal, Demolombe and Lorini [74] have focused
on analyzing the trust that can be associated with information sources. The authors have
integrated graded beliefs into a logical framework that defines different kinds of trust. In
another work [76], Lorini et al. considered the quantitative aspects of trust in a dynamic
epistemic logic setting, where the relationship between trust and belief change is presented.
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The authors proposed Dynamic Logic of graded Belief and Trust (DL-BT), a modal logic
that supports reasoning about agents changing their beliefs based on the degree of trust the
receiver agent has in the information source. The proposed logic combines modal operators
of knowledge, graded belief and trust with dynamic operators of trust-based belief change.
The graded trust operator is interpreted using a neighborhood semantics [80], whose model
checking is still an open problem [38]. In this work, two kinds of trust-based belief change
policies have been considered: additive and compensatory policies, along with the detailed
analysis of their logical properties. Moreover, the authors provided a sound and complete
axiomatization. In [81], the authors introduced a logical framework that combines a formal
logic based on a logic of belief, a logic of time, and a dynamic logic to cognitively rep-
resent the concept of trust (qualitative aspects), and a fuzzy logic to represent the degree
(quantitative aspect) of trust. However, the proposed logics mostly focused on agents with
mental states where the trusting entity is normally capable of exhibiting beliefs, desires,
and intentions, which makes them difficult to be model checked. Moreover, the trust from
the quantitative approach is not considered because the grades are embedded in the modal
operators. [93] present a logic called Certain Logic to evaluate trust under uncertainty by
evaluating a number of Boolean expressions in terms of real values.
The author in [100] proposed a logical language that can be employed to reason about
trust, knowledge, and their interaction. The proposed logic is a modal language augmented
with a trust operator, which is interpreted using a combination of a neighborhood structure
[80] with an added component to assign weights to formulas. Moreover, they provided a
mechanism that can produce values to be fed into Subjective Logic’s trust manipulation
component [53]. The idea of this work is to use the expressive power of the proposed for-
mal language to describe the information possessed by an agent and then transform this
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knowledge into an opinion value about a given proposition with all the three major compo-
nents of subjective logic made explicit. Such components are, respectively, belief, disbelief,
and uncertainty. Then, an evidence based logic is built, such that evidences are assigned
weights that determine whether an agent trusts a given proposition or not.
Huang et al. [51] considered the setting of stochastic multi-agent systems, where
an automated verification framework for quantifying and reasoning about cognitive trust
is proposed. The authors focused on a quantitative notion of trust defined as a subjec-
tive evaluation in order to capture the social notation of trust. This allows one to quantify
the amount of trust as a belief-weighted expectation. In this work, a probabilistic rational
temporal logic PRTL*, which extends the logic PCTL* with reasoning about agents’ men-
tal states is introduced. However, the model checking of the proposed logic was proven
undecidable. Yet, no implementation has been considered and no attempt to evaluate the
approach on any case studies. Considering our approach, trust is defined from a high-level
abstraction without having to depend on agent’s internal mental states, and moreover, quan-
tifies trust by relying only on the accessibility relations. Furthermore, our model checking
algorithm is proved space-efficient.
2.4.3 Model Checking-based Approaches
Some relevant approaches with the aim of verifying trust-based models using formal meth-
ods have appeared recently. For instance, Aldini in [3] has been introduced a formal frame-
work to evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of trust-based models in order to detect
and then isolate different kinds of attacks . Indeed, the author integrates trust modeling with
distributed systems. In this work, the system properties are expressed using a trust tempo-
ral logic (TTL) which combines CTL [43] and its action-based extension (ACTL) [23].
Moreover, the trust system model is based on an instance of both labeled transition systems
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and Kripke structures. The verification of temporal logic properties expressed in TTL has
been performed through a mapping to an existing model checking technique. However, the
model mapping between the two logics has not been specified and TTL can only specify a
single agent model, and it is not adapted to autonomous MASs. In [83], the authors pre-
sented a mechanism for specifying and model checking trust specifications against models
(such as Deontic models) of multi-agent interactions. The authors in [108] considered the
formal verification of auction mechanisms. They implemented simple and intuitive auction
models in a BDI-based programming language, to which they applied agent verification
techniques. In this work some sophisticated agent aspects such as goals, intentions, beliefs
and deliberation within an auction context has been verified. Moreover, they verified some
of the scenarios that is involving a dynamic and static notions of trust. The verification
carried out using an agent model-checking system and the properties verified are given in
a logic of belief, goals and time. However, the approach has been tested on some small
multi-agent programs: variations of the contract net protocol and auction systems, and with
very fewer agents. Overall, their verification system is relatively slow where the speed and
space required were the main problem.
The authors in [11] proposed an approach to model and verify trust models specified
in a Colored Petri Net (CPN). They presented a model (named TCPN) that can be used
to check the performance and behavior of such systems from both simulation and model
checking points of view. In their approach, state-space is used to formalize the conceptual
model of trust, which is then represented by Colored Petri nets to entitle for simulation
and verification using existing modeling tools. Yet, this work fail to provide a verification
of a trust model using model checking, and moreover, no attackers are considered in their
modeling.
Model checking service trust behaviors has been recently investigated in [42], where
27
the authors present a model checking framework to verify the trust behaviors model against
regular and non-regular properties. To model their target system, the authors introduced an
algorithm to generate a configuration graph of a deterministic pushdown automata (PDA),
where the trust behaviors are captured through the observations’ sequences related to certain
interactions between the services and users. By doing so, they overcome the problem of
non-regular model checking algorithms based on PDA. From the semantics point of view,
they specified the trust behavior properties using Fixed point Logic with Chop (FLC). By
using the chop operator, they were able to represent the non-regular properties. Moreover,
they applied a symbolic FLC model checking algorithm to verify service trust behaviors
with respect to trust properties. Indeed, FCL behavior formulae and the generated models
are used as the inputs to the mcflc model checker tool which is the only tool for FLC model
checking. However, this approach lacks formal semantics for trust because trust formulae
are inferred from the context free grammar of trust pattern languages. Besides, non-regular
behaviors verification is limited by its EXPTIME complexity, where no attempt to reduce it
to polynomial time has been made in this approach. Moreover, the approach is not designed
to formalize and verify trust for autonomous MASs. Further, none of these approaches tend
to focus on model checking quantitative trust.
On the other hand, model checking trust can also be achieved by indirect techniques,
also called transformation-based methods. The idea is to apply certain reduction rules in
order to transform the problem at hand to an existing model checking problem. In fact,
transformation has been acknowledged as an alternative mechanism for verifying various
MASs aspects. The main advantage of this technique is that it enables the designers of
MASs applications to get benefit from powerful and already tested model checkers. This
technique has been applied for model checking commitments [36], knowledge [71], and the
interaction between knowledge and commitments [2, 99]. To the best of our knowledge,
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Table 2.1: Comparison between the list of publications reviewed for this thesis with respect
to the proposed criteria.
Approach C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
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our work is the first attempt that introduces and implements a full transformation technique
for verifying trust specifications in MASs.
In summary, we compare only the existing approaches that are mainly related to our
research by taking into consideration the following criteria: being cognitive, being social,
considering explicit notion of trust, analyzing complexity, dealing with graded modality,
supporting model checking, and proving the soundness and completeness. We refer to these
criteria as C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, and C7 respectively. Cognitive and social properties
indicate whether the logic is based on BDI logics (i.e., logics that describe the mental atti-
tudes of agents in terms of beliefs, desires and intentions) or other temporal logics. Explicit
notion of trust shows if it is possible to express trust by an explicit modality (i.e., logics
that rely on a trust modality) or by means of one or more predicates. Moreover, complexity
analysis states whether it is considered or not in the proposed approach. Graded modality
indicates whether the work addresses the quantitative aspects of trust. Applicability for
model checking confirms the presentation of a formal verification technique to verify the
proposed approach, or specifying if the approach is applicable for model checking. Finally,
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check whether they address the soundness and completeness of the proposed logic. A sum-
mary about the comparison between the existing approaches and our approach with respect
to the proposed criteria is presented in Table 2.1.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the background and concepts needed for the rest of the thesis.
Moreover, we also presented a revision of the most relevant related work. In the next
chapter, we propose a new approach for modeling and verifying trust in MASs.
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Chapter 3
Logic-based Framework for Specifying
and Model Checking Trust in MASs
In this chapter, we present a new logic-based framework for specifying and model checking
preconditional trust in MASs. We start by introducing TCTL, a new temporal logic of trust
that extends the Computation Tree Logic (CTL) to enable reasoning about trust with pre-
conditions (Section 3.2). A new vector-extended version of interpreted systems is defined to
capture the trust relationship between the interacting parties in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4,
we introduce a set of reasoning postulates along with formal proofs to support our logic.
Moreover, Section 3.5 presents new model checking algorithms to formally and automat-
ically verify the system under consideration against some desirable properties expressed
using the proposed logic. We fully implemented our proposed algorithms by extended the
MCMAS model checker for MASs. Hence, a new model checker tool called MCMAS-
T, dedicated to TCTL, along with its new input language VISPL (Vector-extended ISPL)
have been created. We evaluated the tool and reported experimental results using a real-life
scenario in the health-care domain1.
1The results of this chapter are collected from our publications in [31, 32]
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3.1 An Overview of The Proposed Approach
The study of trust in MASs has been an area of interest for many researchers over the
last years. This is due to the fact that trust is the basis for agent communication wherein
entities have to operate in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Several approaches have
been proposed to define logical semantics for trust in MASs. However, these approaches
are limited to reason about trust based on the sole agents’ mental states. Therefore, in
this research, we consider trust from a high-level abstraction based on the social behaviors
of agents. Specifically, we propose a logical framework that allows us to reason about
preconditional trust and time. Figure 3.1 illustrates the main parts of the proposed approach.
It specifically consists of three different, but fully integrated parts. In the logical language
part, we develop a new branching-time trust temporal logic called TCTL. This logic is
an extension of the CTL logic [43] with a new operator for trust along with its intuitive
semantics to effectively modeling trust interactions as temporal modality. In this part, we
also express reasoning rules with proofs that they are supported in the proposed logic. In
the algorithmic part, we develop new algorithms to tackle the problem of model checking
TCTL by examining both explicit and symbolic state model checking. In the third part,
we completely implement our algorithm on top of the model checker MCMAS [73] that
results in a new open source tool called MCMAS-T. We also extend the input modeling
and encoding language of MCMAS with the vector-based semantics to produce a new one
called VISPL.
3.2 Trust Computation Tree Logic TCTL
TCTL is a combination of branching time temporal logic (CTL) [43] with trust modality
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Figure 3.1: The main parts of the proposed approach
Definition 3.1. (Syntax of TCTL)
The syntax of TCTL is defined as follows:
f := r j :f j f _f j EXf j EGf j E(fUf) j Tp(i; j;f ;f)
where r;E;A;X ;G;_; and U are defined in Definition 2.1 (Chapter 2). The modality
Tp(i; j;y;j) stands for “Preconditional Trust” and is read as “the truster i trusts the trustee
j to bring about j given that the precondition y holds”. That is, we have the trust over
the content given that the precondition is satisfied. A path p in a model M from a state
s0 is an infinite sequence of reachable global states p = s0s1s2    such that for all i  0
,(si;s(i+1)) 2 R.
Example 3.1. The following formula represents a simple interaction between a buyer and a
seller in an e-commerce setting. It states the buyer trusts the seller will deliver the requested
items under the precondition that the latter has received the payment.
Tp(buyer;seller; Items_Paid; Items_Delivered)
33
3.3 Vector-based Interpreted Systems
In order to account for the trust relationship between the truster and trustee, we extend
the original formalism of interpreted systems [44] introduced in Section 2.2 to explicitly
capture the trust relationship that is established between agents engaged in an interaction.
We introduce the notion of agents’ vector n . That is, for each agent i 2 Agt, a vector n i of
size jAgtj is associated with each local state li 2 Li of this agent. n i(i);n i( j); : : : ;n i(k) are
the components of the vector n i where (i; j; : : : ;k) 2 Agt jAgtj. This vector will be used to
define the trust accessibility relation. Indeed, the set of local vectors ni represents the vision
of agent i with regard to the trust of other agents. This extension allows us to provide an
intuitive semantics for direct trust that takes place between interacting parties. The vector-
extended formalism is composed of:
 A set Agt = f1; : : : ;ng of n agents in which each agent i 2 Agt is described by:
– A non-empty set of local states Li, which represents the complete information
that the agent can access at a particular time;
– A set of local actions Acti to model the temporal evolution of the system;
– A set of local vectors ni.
– A local protocol ri : Li! 2Acti assigning a list of enabled actions that may be
performed by agent i in a given local state Li;
– A local evolution function ti is defined as: ti = LiActi! Li, which determines
the transitions for an individual agent i between local states;
 A set of global states s 2 S that represent a snapshot of all agents in the system at
a given time. A global state s is a tuple s = (l1 : : : ln). The notation li(s) is used to
represent the local state of agent i in the global state s. Similarly, the notation ni( j)(s)
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is used to represent the jth component of the local vector of agent i in the global state
s;
 I  S is a set of initial global states for the system;
 The global evolution function of the system is defined as follows: t : SACT  ! S,
where ACT = Act1 : : :Actn and each component a 2 ACT is called a joint action,
which is a tuple of actions.
Definition 3.2. (Model of TCTL)
A model of trust generated from the vector-based interpreted systems is a tuple M =
(S;R; I;f i! j j(i; j) 2 Agt2g;V ), where:
 S is a non-empty set of reachable global states for the system;
 R SS is the transition relation;
 I  S is a set of initial global states for the system;
  i! j  S S is the direct trust accessibility relation for each truster-trustee pair of
agents (i; j) 2 Agt2 defined by i! j iff:
– li(s)(n i( j)) = li(s0)(n i( j));
– s0 is reachable from s using transitions from the transition relation R;
 V : S! 2AP is a labeling function, where AP is a set of atomic propositions.
The intuition of the relation i! j is, for agent i to gain trust in agent j, the former
identifies the states that are compatible with their trust vision with regard to the latter, i.e.,
where agent i is expecting that agent j is trustful. Specifically, for two global states s;s0 2 S,
s i! j s0 obtained by comparing the element n i( j) in the local state li at the global state
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s (denoted by li(s)(n i( j))) with n i( j) in the local state li at the global state s0 (denoted by
li(s0)(n i( j))). Thus, the trust accessibility of agent i towards agent j (i.e., i! j) does exist
only if the element value that we have for agent j in the vector of the local states of agent i
for both global states is the same, i.e., li(s)(n i( j))= li(s0)(n i( j)). Finally, infinite sequences
of states linked by transitions define paths. If p is a path, then p(i) is the (i+1)th state in
p . This idea is illustrated in Figure 3.2. In the figure, the solid line represents the transition
relation from R, and the dashed line represents the direct trust accessibility relation i! j.
In this example, s0 is compatible with s with regard to the trust of agent i towards the agent
j. We assign a vector to each agent’s local states. n i3 is the vector of agent i where 3 is the
number of interacting agents at that time. The agent i compares the element of her vector at
global states s and s0. The particular value of the n i( j) of agent i is the same in both states.
Definition 3.3. (Semantics of TCTL)
Given the model M, the satisfaction for a TCTL formula f in a global state s, denoted
as (M;s) j= f , is recursively defined as follows:
 (M;s) j= Tp(i; j;y;f) iff (M;s) j= y ^:f and 9 s0 6= s such that s i! j s0 , and 8
s0 6= s such that s i! j s0, we have (M;s0) j= f .
The formal semantics of the CTL formulae, a temporal fragment of TCTL, is intro-
duced in Definition 2.2. For the state formula Tp(i; j;y;f), it is satisfied in the model M at
s iff (1) there exists a state s0 such that s0 6= s and s i! j s0, and (2) all the trust accessible
states s0 that are different from the current state s satisfy the content of trust f . Moreover, for
the trust to take place between the interacting agents i and j, we add the condition y ^:f ,
which must be satisfied in the current state s to ensure that the precondition y holds before
the trust content f is brought about.
The following proposition is direct from the definition of the accessibility relation.
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Figure 3.2: An example of accessibility relation i! j
Proposition 3.1. The accessibility relation i! j is reflexive and transitive. Thus, the re-
sulting logic of trust is an S4 system of modal logic.
3.4 Reasoning Postulates and The Case Study
In this section, we consider the Breast Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment (BCDT) 2 pro-
tocol as an illustrative application example to clarify the proposed reasoning postulates.
Thereafter, we introduce the reasoning rules along with the required proofs to capture the
properties of our logic.
3.4.1 Breast Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment: A Case Study
The BCDT protocol is introduced by the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
(ASPE) project to be used for regulating the interaction between five participating parties
involved in the cancer diagnosis process. These parties are: patient denoted by p, physi-
cian (ph), pathologist (pg), radiologist (rg), and registrar (r). In [102, 33], the authors
2Available at: http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/PathRad/index.html
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formalized this scenario in terms of commitments, identifying the contractual business re-
lationships among the parties involved. Indeed, such relationships can be founded as a basic
of defining trust specifications as requirements for engineering contracts among parties.
The process of BCDT protocol starts when the physician notices a suspicious mass
in the patient’s breast. Thereafter, the patient is immediately directed to the radiology de-
partment to do a mammography (a technique using X-rays to diagnose and detect breasts
tumors). If the radiologist observes suspicious calcification, he will send a report to the
physician to recommend a biopsy. The physician requests a radiologist to carry out a biopsy.
The radiologist obtains diagnostic tissue from the patient and then sends it to the laboratory
along with pertinent clinical information for further analysis by a pathologist. This latter
plays a vital role in the diagnosis process. He analyzes the tissue specimen through imaging
studies and determines whether a malignant disease is present or not. Both the radiologist
and pathologist create and release a report of their collective findings. Finally, the physician
reviews the complete report with the patient to decide about a treatment plan. At the same
time, the pathologist forwards the report to the registrar whose role is to insert the patient
information into the cancer registry.
3.4.2 Reasoning Postulates
We present here relevant reasoning postulates of our logic that reflect its properties. These
postulates capture common reasoning patterns about trust. Some of those postulates are
similar to the ones discussed in [98].
P1: Fulfillment. f !:Tp(i; j;y;f)
 Meaning: The trust has been achieved, so if the content already holds, then the trust
is no longer active.
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 Proof: The rule is derived directly from the semantics of Tp(i; j;y;f) which indi-
cates that the current state does not satisfy f .
 Example: According to the BCDT protocol, once the physician requests a mammog-
raphy to be done (Mammo_Req), there will be no need to establish the trust between
the patient and physician with regard to this request under the precondition that a sus-
picious mass is noticed (Mass_Not) because this mammography is already requested
(the trust content already holds).
Formally: Mammo_Req!:Tp(p; ph;Mass_Not;Mammo_Req).
P2: Content Partial Partition. Tp(i; j;y;f1^f2)^:f1! Tp(i; j;y;f1)
 Meaning: The trust to bring about a conjunction is the trust for each part separately
unless it does already hold.
 Proof: Assume that (M;s) j= Tp(i; j;y;f1 ^ f2)^:f1 . From the semantics, we
obtain (M;s) j= y ^:f1 , and there exists a state s0 such that s0 6= s and s i! j s0
, and all the trust accessible states s0 such that s 6= s0 and s i! j s0 satisfy f1 ^ f2 .
Thus, these states also satisfy f1 . Consequently, (M;s) j= Tp(y;f1).
 Example: Suppose, for instance, that the physician trusts the radiologist to collect
diagnostic tissue from the patient (Tiss_Coll) and send the specimen to the labora-
tory (Tiss_Send) with the precondition that the a mammography is requested, then
the physician trusts the radiologist for the collection of the diagnostic tissue, unless
this tissue has been already obtained. Formally, Tp(ph;rg;Mammo_Req;Tiss_Coll^
Tiss_Send)^:Tiss_Coll! Tp(i; j; ph;rg;Mammo_Req;Tiss_Coll).
P3: Content Full Partition. Tp(i; j;y;f1^f2)! Tp(i; j;y;f1)_Tp(i; j;y;f2)
 Meaning: If the trust to bring about a conjunction holds, then at least the trust to
bring about one part holds.
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 Proof: Assume that (M;s) j= Tp(i; j;y;f1 ^ f2). From the semantics, we obtain
(M;s) j= y ^ (:f1_:f2) , and there exists a state s0 such that s0 6= s and s i! j s0,
and all the trust accessible states s0 such that s 6= s0 and s i! j s0 satisfy f1^f2 . Thus,
for all those states s0, (M;s0) j= f1 or (M;s0) j= f2. Consequently, Tp(i; j;y;f1)_
Tp(i; j;y;f2) holds.
 Example: As previous example, suppose that the physician trusts the radiologist
to collect diagnostic tissue from the patient and send the specimen to the labora-
tory, then the physician trusts that radiologist for at least one of the two actions. In
fact, if the two actions do not hold currently, then the physician trusts the radiologist
to perform them both. Formally, Tp(ph;rg;Mammo_Req;Tiss_Coll^Tiss_Send)!
Tp(ph;rg;Mammo_Req;Tiss_Coll)_Tp(ph;rg;Mammo_Req;Tiss_Send).
P4: Non-Conflict. Tp(i; j;y;f)!:Tp(i; j;y;:f)^:Tp(i; j;:y;f)
 Meaning: Trust must be consistent, content and precondition wise. A truster cannot
trust a trustee 1) to bring about a content and its negation simultaneously; and 2) to
bring about a content with a precondition and its negation simultaneously.
 Proof: From the left side, s satisfies y , there exists a state s0 2 S such that s 6= s0 and
s i! j s0, and all the accessible states s0 such that s 6= s0 satisfy f . Since a state that
satisfies f (resp. y) cannot satisfy :f (resp. :y), we are done.
 Example: When the patient trusts the physician to request the mammography with
the precondition that a mass is noticed, then the trust not to request the mammography
with the same precondition and the trust to request the mammography knowing that
the mass is not noticed cannot hold. Formally: Tp(p; ph;Mass_Not;Mammo_Req)!
:Tp(p; ph;Mass_Not;:Mammo_Req)^:Tp(p; ph;:Mass_Not;Mammo_Req).
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P5: Non-Vacuity. From y ` f infer :Tp(i; j;y;f)3
 Meaning: Trust must be for something tangible.
 Proof: Assume that Tp(i; j;y;f). Thus, from the semantics, the current state s satis-
fies y ^:f , which is contradiction with y ` f , which means we can get f from y ,
so the rule.
 Example: It does not make sense that the physician trusts the radiologist to collect
the tissue if it is already sent to the laboratory. Formally: Tiss_Send ` Tiss_Coll infer
:Tp(ph;rg;Tiss_Send;Tiss_Coll).
P6: Precondition Slackening: From Tp(i; j;y1;f);y1 ` y2 infer Tp(i; j;y2;f)
 Meaning: If trust holds for a stronger precondition, then it holds for a weaker one.
 Proof: Assume that (M;s) j= Tp(i; j;y1;f). From the semantics, (M;s) j= y1^:f ,
and there exists a state s0 2 S such that s 6= s0 and s i! j s0, and for all the trust
accessible states s0 such that s 6= s0, we have (M;s0) j= f . Since y1 ` y2, meaning
that y2 is provable from y1, we conclude (M;s) j= y2, so we are done.
 Example: When the physician trusts that the radiologist will send a report of her
findings with the precondition that a biopsy is requested, then the physician safely
trusts the latter about sending the report with the precondition that a mammogra-
phy is requested because requesting a biopsy entails that a mammography has been
requested.
 Instances: The following rules are instances or consequences of the precondition
slackening postulate:
3The symbol ` is an element of the object language, while the word infer is from the metalanguage.
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1- Tp(i; j;y;f)! Tp(i; j;>;f). This means if trust holds for a precondition, then it
holds with no precondition. In other words, when the precondition is confirmed, then
only the trust content matters.
2- Tp(i; j;y1 ^y2;f)! Tp(i; j;y1;f). This means when the trust holds for a con-
junctive precondition, then it comes into effect for each part of this conjunction.
3- Tp(i; j;y1;f)! Tp(i; j;y1_y2;f). This means the trust to bring about the content
f with a disjunctive precondition holds if the trust about the same content holds for a
part of the disjunction.
P7: Precondition Extension. Tp(i; j;y1;f)^y2! Tp(i; j;y1^y2;f)
 Meaning: If trust holds for a precondition y1, then it still holds for an extended
precondition with y2 subject to the satisfaction of the extending part (i.e., y2).
 Proof: The satisfaction of y1, :f , the existence of a trust accessible state differ-
ent from the current state, and the satisfaction of f in all these accessible states are
derived from the satisfaction of Tp(i; j;y1;f), and the satisfaction of y2 is already
given, so the postulate.
 Example: Suppose that the radiologist trusts that the registrar will insert the patient’s
name into a cancer registry with the precondition that the patient sends the consensus
report. Then, the trust holds with the additional precondition that the patient accepts
to forward her information to healthcare providers.
P8: Precondition Transfer. Tp(i; j;y1;f)^y2! Tp(i; j;y2;f)
 Meaning: If trust holds for a precondition, then it comes into effect for any true
precondition.
 Proof: This postulate is a direct consequence of P7 and Instance 2 of P6.
42
 Example: From the previous example, the trust holds if the precondition is trans-
ferred to the fact that the patient accepts to forward her information to healthcare
providers.
P9: Exchange. Tp(i; j;y1;f1)^Tp(i; j;y2;f2)! Tp(i; j;y1;f2)
 Meaning: Once a trust holds, its precondition can be exchanged with the precondi-
tion of another holding trust.
 Proof: From Tp(i; j;y1;f1), we have (M;s) j=y1, and from Tp(i; j;y2;f2), (M;s) j=
:f2 and there exists a state s0 2 S such that s 6= s0 and s i! j s0, and all the trust
accessible states s0 different from s satisfy f2, so the postulate.
 Example: Suppose again that the radiologist trusts that the registrar will insert the
patient’s name into a cancer registry if the patient sends the consensus report, and also
trusts the same registrar to forward the patient’s information to healthcare providers
under the acceptance of the patient as precondition, then both trusts hold regardless
with which precondition since both preconditions hold already.
P10: Combination. Tp(i; j;y1;f1)^Tp(i; j;y2;f2)! Tp(i; j;y1^y2;f1^f2)
 Meaning: The conjunction of two trusts between the same truster and trustee yields
a combined trust, precondition and content wise.
 Proof: From the left side, we have (M;s) j= y1 ^y2 ^ (:f1 ^:f2), which implies
(M;s) j= y1^y2^:(f1^f2). Moreover, there exists a state s0 2 S such that s 6= s0
and s i! j s0, and all the trust accessible states different from s, (M;s0) j= f1 and
(M;s0) j= f2, so the postulate.
 Example: As previous example, the radiologist’s trust that the registrar will insert the
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patient’s name into a cancer registry and forward the patient’s information to health-
care providers under the acceptance of the patient of the two actions as precondition
hold if each trust holds individually.
 Instances: The following rules are instances of the combination postulate:
1- Tp(i; j;y1;f)^Tp(i; j;y2;f)! Tp(i; j;y1^y2;f). This means the truster trusts
the trustee to bring about a content under a combined precondition if the trust about
the same content holds for each precondition separately.
2- Tp(i; j;y;f1)^Tp(i; j;y;f2)! Tp(i; j;y;f1 ^ f2). This means the truster trusts
the trustee to bring about a combined content under a precondition if the trust about
each content separately holds for the same precondition.
P11: Content Inference. From Tp(i; j;y;f1);f1 ` f2;:f2 infer Tp(i; j;y;f2)
 Meaning: The trust to bring about f2 yields if the truster trusts the trustee to bring
about a content from which f2 derives, knowing that f2 does not hold currently.
 Proof: From the semantics of Tp(i; j;y;f1), (M;s) j= y , there exists a state s0 2 S
such that s 6= s0 and s i! j s0, and all the trust accessible states s0 satisfy f1. These
states satisfy f2 since f1 ` f2. Thus the rule follows from the fact that (M;s) j= :f2.
 Example: Suppose that the radiologist trusts that the registrar will insert the patient’s
name into a provincial cancer registry with the precondition that the patient sends
the consensus report, then the radiologist trusts that the patient’s name will be added
to the national registry as well, if not done already, because being in the provincial
registry automatically triggers the process of being added to the national registry.
P12: Trust Achievement and Non-Contradiction. Tp(i; j;y;f)!EF(f^:Tp(i; j;>;:f))
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 Meaning: There is always a way to honor trust about a content f and when it is
honored, the trust stays consistent, so no trust about the negation of f can hold.
 Proof: Assume that (M;s) j= Tp(i; j;y;f), so from the semantics, f holds in all the
trust accessible states s0 from s. Since trust accessibility implies reachability, then f
holds in a possible future of s, i.e., EF(f). Moreover, in each trust accessible state
s0, two cases could take place.
– Case 1: @s00 6= s0 s.t. s0 i! js00. In this case s0 j= :Tp(i; j;>;:f)
– Case 2: 9s00 6= s0 s.t. s0 i! js00. Assume that one of the trust accessible states s00
from s0 satisfies :f . Since trust accessibility is transitive, s00 is also accessible
from s, so it cannot satisfy :f , which contradicts the above. Consequently, also
in this case s0 j= :Tp(i; j;>;:f).
As s0 j= f , we are done.
 Example: Suppose that the radiologist trusts that the registrar will insert the patient’s
name into a cancer registry with the precondition that the patient sends the consensus
report, then we know this will eventually happen where the radiologist cannot trust
the opposite to happen.
P13: Content Nonexistence. AG:f !:Tp(i; j;y;f)
 Meaning: If the content of trust does not hold in all reachable states, then the trust
never holds.
 Proof: The proof is straightforward from the semantics and from the fact that all
states s0 such that s i! j s0 are reachable.
 Instance: The following rule is a consequence of the content nonexistence postulate:
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1- :Tp(i; j;y;?). This represents the content consistency and means trust to false
cannot hold.
P14: Precondition Nonexistence. AG:y !:Tp(i; j;y;f)
 Meaning: There is no trust if the precondition never holds.
 Proof: The proof is straightforward since the first condition for Tp(i; j;y;f) to hold
is the satisfaction of y in the current state.
 Instance: The following rule is a consequence of the precondition nonexistence pos-
tulate:
1- :Tp(i; j;?;f). This represents the precondition consistency and means trust with
a false precondition cannot come to effect.
3.5 Automatic Verification of TCTL Properties of MASs
In this section, we present two separate algorithms to address the problem of model check-
ing TCTL. We aim to investigate the most intuitive and efficient algorithm for computing
the trust set. In particular, we explore two model checking paradigms: explicit state model
checking and symbolic algorithm. We start by introducing explicit state model checking
algorithm for TCTL. Then, we extend the standard CTL symbolic algorithm introduced in
[21] by adding the procedure that deals with the trust modality in our logic.
3.5.1 Explicit Algorithm of Trust
Here, we introduce our approach to tackle the problem of model checking TCTL. The main
idea is based on our proposed semantics of trust where the set of global states satisfying the
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trust formula Tp(i; j;y;f) in a given model M is computed by calculating the set of states
satisfying y ^:f that can reach and see the states that satisfy f through the accessibility
relation  i! j. Our proposed semantics requires the additional constraint that the current
state s is different from the accessible state s0 in order for the trust to be established between
interacting agents. Thus, our algorithm is implemented by directly going through all the
states that satisfy y ^:f (the set of these states is denoted by X), eliminating the state
itself, and checking if any state in X satisfies the trust formula. Algorithm 1 describes
the approach where the procedure MCT (i; j;y;f ;M) returns the set of states in which the
trust formula holds. First, the algorithm starts by computing the set Y of states in which
the negation of the formula f holds. Afterwards, the procedure calculates the set X. The
algorithm then iterates using for each . . . do to go through all the states of X (satisfying
y^:f ) to construct the set V of those states that are reachable from the states in X without
considering the state itself to avoid any non-trivial loop to the same state. Thereafter, the
algorithm proceeds to build the set V0 of all the states that are reachable and accessible
through the accessibility relation i! j (i.e., where their global states have identical local
states for agent i with regard to the element n i( j) of the vector n i). Precisely, in each
iteration, the algorithm checks if from a given state in X there exists an accessible state
different from that state (V0 6= /0) and if all the accessible states from that state satisfy f
(V0\Y = /0). In this case, that particular state will be added to the resulting set Z. Finally,
the procedure returns the set Z of the states that satisfy the formula Tp(i; j;y;f). The
algorithm is a direct implementation of the semantics, so it soundness is straightforward.
In fact, to deal with non-self-loops, each individual state that satisfies y ^:f is visited and
only returned if all its accessible states different from it satisfy f . Since states satisfying
y^:f are the only potential states to satisfy the commitment formula Tp(i; j;y;f), visiting
each of these states and checking them one by one guarantees that all states that satisfy the
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formula will be returned, and since only the potential states are visited, no state satisfying
:Tp(i; j;y;f)will be returned. By so doing, any state satisfying y^:f that can be reached
through a non-self-loop will be returned as well if all accessible states different from it
satisfy f . Thus, even if the state is accessible from itself, because the accessibility relation
is reflexive, it will be returned, although it satisfies :f because the state itself is already
eliminated when accessible states are checked.
Algorithm 1 MCT (i; j;y;f ;M): the set [[ Tp(i; j;y;f)]]
1: Y SMC(:f);
2: X SMC(y)\Y;
3: for each x 2 X do
4: V fs 2 S j s is reachable from xgnfxg;
5: V0 fs 2 V j li(s)(n i( j)) = li(x)(n i( j))g;




Figure 3.3 depicts an example illustrating the algorithm. The example shows a partic-
ular case where the state s4 that satisfies the trust formula Tp(i; j;y;f) is reachable through
a non-self-loop: s4;s5;s0;s1;s2;s4. Although the state s4 has an accessible and reachable
state that satisfies :f , which is the sate itself, the algorithm should return that state because
the semantics requires the accessible states that should be considered to be different from
the state itself. Thus, our proposed algorithm examines this particular case by explicitly
eliminating the state itself to avoid the non-self-loop. However, to consider this particular
case, the algorithm needs to go through each state in the set X using the loop for each . . . do,
so that the state itself can be marked and so eliminated. From the figure, the computation
of Algorithm 1 regarding the trust formula Tp(i; j;y;f) is as follows: Y= fs0;s1;s2;s3;s4g
and X = fs1;s3;s4g. The algorithm iterates over all the states in X. In the first iteration
(x = s1);V and V0 are computed as follows: V = fs0;s2;s3;s4;s5g and V0 = fs2g because
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s2 is the only state that is accessible from s1, however, s1 will not be added to the set Z
because s2 is not satisfying f . For the next state in X (x= s3), the computation of the sets V
and V0 are as follows: V = /0 and V0 = /0. In the last iteration (x = s4), the sets V and V0 are
computed as follows: V = fs0;s1;s2;s3;s5g and V0 = fs5g. As the two conditions of Line
6 are met, the state s4 will be added to the set Z, making Z = fs4g. Thus, the returned set
after iterating over X is fs4g.
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Figure 3.3: Example to illustrate Algorithm 1
However, such an algorithm can be inefficient when the system has a large state space
since we have to go explicitly through all the states in X. In fact, the issue arises in this
algorithm when the model under consideration has a non-self-loop because we have to
check whether the current state s is different from each accessible state s0 or not, which
requires the “marking” of each state when we check the reachability. This is mandatory
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because models could have loops in their state space. To overcome this drawback, we
introduce symbolic algorithm in order to avoid explicit enumeration of all the states and
consider only a subset of models with no non-self-loop (also called flat models). We refer
to explicit algorithm (Algorithm 1) as direct approach and symbolic algorithm (Algorithm
3) as revisited approach.
3.5.2 BDD-based Algorithm of Trust
We start by presenting the main algorithm (Algorithm 2) that extends the standard symbolic
model checking algorithm for CTL. This algorithm takes as input the model M and the
TCTL formula f and returns the set [[f ]] of states that satisfy f in M. By giving the model
M, the algorithm recursively go through the structure of f and constructs the set [[f ]] with
respect to a set of Boolean operations applied to sets. In (Algorithm 2), the lines 1 to 6
invoke the standard algorithms used in CTL to compute the set of states that satisfy regular
CTL formulas. Line 7 calls our procedure which computes the set of states that satisfy the
trust formula.
Algorithm 2 SMC(f ;M): the set [[f ]] of states satisfying the TCTL formula f
1: f is an atomic formula: return V (f);
2: f is :f1: return S SMC(f1;M);
3: f is f1_f2: return SMC(f1;M)[SMC(f2;M);
4: f is EXf1 : return SMCEX(f1;M) ;
5: f is E(f1[f2) : return SMCE[(f1;f2;M);
6: f is EGf1: return SMCEG(f1;M);
7: f is Tp(i; j;f1;f2): return SMCT (i; j;f1;f2;M);
Algorithm 3 reports the symbolic approach. In this algorithm, the computation of
the set of states that satisfy the trust formula Tp(i; j;y;f) is performed as follows. First, the
algorithm considers the transition relation without self-loop denoted asT F to cope with the
fact that each accessible state should be different from itself. It then proceeds to compute
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the sets Y and X. It then builds the set X of states in S that are reachable from a state (or
from more states) in X. Thereafter, it assigns those states in X that satisfy :f to the set
W. The algorithm invokes the procedure TrustRelation(W;X;X) twice. In the first call, it
constructs the set L by calculating the set of states in X (the states that have y^:f ) that can
access a different state in W through the accessibility relation i! j (i.e., indistinguishable
states for agent i from the states in W that satisfy :f if their global states have identical
local states for agent i with regard to the element n i( j) of the vector n i). Formally:
L = fs 2 X j 9s0 2 Y\X such that s0 6= s^ li(s)(n i( j)) = li(s0)(n i( j))g
Thus, L is the set of states that satisfyy^:f but do not satisfy the trust formula Tp(i; j;y;f)
because each of these states has an accessible state, different from the state itself, that sat-
isfies :f . Consequently, the algorithm eliminates from X the states in L (Line 7). It then
assigns to the new set W the states that are reachable (X) and satisfy f (S Y). Finally, the
algorithm calls the procedure TrustRelation(W;X;X) to build the set Z of those states in
X that have an accessible state satisfying f . Formally:
Z = fs 2 X j 9s0 2 (S Y)\X such that s0 6= s^ li(s)(n i( j)) = li(s0)(n i( j))g
Thus, Z is the set of the states satisfying the trust formula Tp(i; j;y;f) since all the potential
states that do not satisfy the formula are already eliminated. Consequently, having only one
accessible state that satisfies f guarantees that all the accessible states satisfy f , which
entails the soundness of the algorithm.
Algorithm 4 illustrates the procedure TrustRelation(W;X;X). This procedure is
given as inputs three sets of states W, X, and X where only the set W is getting updated
after each iteration. The procedure iterates using do . . . while until the iteration is terminated
when (W\X = /0), which means, when there is no pre-images of the set W0, or when the
pre-images of this set are not reachable from X. In each iteration, going through all the
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Algorithm 3 SMCT (i; j;y;f ;M): the set [[ Tp(i; j;y;f)]]
1: T F be the transition relation without self-loop;
2: Y SMC(:f);
3: X SMC(y)\Y;








values in the domain of n i( j), the set W0 contains the states s in W that have the same value
li(s)(n i( j)). Then, the algorithm builds the set V0 as the pre-images of W0 that are in the
reachable set X with respect to the transition relation. Finally, the procedure calculates the




3: for each v in the domain of n i( j)
4: W0 fs 2W j li(s)(n i( j)) = vg;
5: V0 Preimage(W0;T F)\X;




10: while W\X 6= /0
11: return Z
Figure 3.4 illustrates an example of a flat model. The computation of Algorithm 3
regarding the trust formula Tp(i; j;y;f) is as follows: Y = fs1;s2;s6;s7g (Line 2), X =
fs1;s2;s7g (Line 3), X = fs1;s2;s3;s4;s5;s6;s7g (Line 4), and W = fs1;s2;s6;s7g (Line 5).
When the algorithm calls the procedure TrustRelation(W;X;X) for the first time, it returns
L = fs1g (Line 6). Then, the algorithm eliminates the returned states, thus X = fs2;s7g
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(Line 7) and W = fs3;s4;s5g (Line 8). In the second call, the set Z = fs2g (Line 9), which
is the only state that satisfies the formula.
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Figure 3.4: Illustrative example of model without-loop (flat)
To show that Algorithm 3 works only for flat models which do not include non-self-
loops, let us consider the case depicted in Figure 3.4. The computation of the different
sets is as follows: Y = fs0;s1;s2;s3;s4g, X = fs1;s3;s4g, X = fs0;s1;s2;s3;s4;s5g, and
W= fs0;s1;s2;s3;s4g. However, the first call to TrustRelation(W;X;X)will not terminate.
The reason is that for this procedure to terminate, the condition on Line 10 (Algorithm 4)
should satisfy W\X = /0. Since X includes all the states of the model, the only possibility
for the procedure to terminate is to have W = /0, which implies V = /0. For V to be empty,
V0 should be empty as well. This entails two possibilities: 1) either states in W0 have
no pre-image; or 2) W0 is empty. The first option cannot happen since the model is not
flat, and the second option cannot take place since the first instance of W is not empty.
In general, the procedure TrustRelation(W;X;X) will not terminate on non-flat models
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since the reachable states involved in the non-self loops will always have pre-images, so the
condition in Line 10 will never be satisfied.
3.6 Implementation and Experiments
One of our goals in this work is to implement a model checker for trust. We also aim to
verify various properties of MASs when the trust relationship takes place between the inter-
acting agents. To do so, we have incorporated our proposed algorithms presented in Section
3.5 into the symbolic model checker MCMAS [73]. MCMAS is a model checker tool for
MASs which can verify a variety of properties specified in different temporal logics. It
has been successfully used to check various applications such as services composition [7].
Moreover, the tool has been extended to MCMAS+ to deal with social commitments [33]
and has been used as the core for SMC4AC, a model checker recently launched for intel-
ligent agent communication [35]. ISPL (Interpreted Systems Programming Language) is
the input language used to model MAS within MCMAS. We extended the MCMAS toolkit
to handle our proposed grammar of the trust modality specified in Definition 3.2. More-
over, we enriched ISPL to support the vector-based semantics of the extended interpreted
systems which is needed for the trust accessibility relation. The newly implemented in-
put language and model checker are called VISPL (Vector-extended ISPL) and MCMAS-T
(Trust-extended MCMAS) respectively 4.
4The tool is available online at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/xy0wjrvvk36d00z/
mcmas-t-1.0.1-sc.tar.gz?dl=0
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3.6.1 Evaluation: The Breast Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment (BCDT).
In this section, we conduct a detailed evaluation of the developed technique using the case
study presented in Section 3.4. [33] formalized the same case study in terms of social com-
mitments where they demonstrated how commitments can be specified and model checked.
In this work, we use our formal model M = (S;R; I; i! j;V ) associated to the vector-
based interpreted systems introduced earlier in Section 3 to formally model the protocol.
According to this protocol, five parties are involved in the cancer diagnosis process, which
are: Patient, Physician, Radiologist, Pathologist and Registrar. Moreover, an environ-
ment agent e is added to represent the protocol. In this scenario, the trust relationships
between the participating parties express the system requirements that regulate the interact-
ing agents. Such requirements are specified using our logic of trust TCTL. We capture the
trust in this protocol by defining the following atomic propositions: Mass_Not for mass
noticed, Mammo_Req for mammography requested, Cal_Det for calcification detected,
Biop_Rec for biopsy recommended, Treat_Plan_Agr for treatment plan agreed, and
Rep_Rec for report received. The involved parties must have the possibility of reaching
states in which some of these propositions hold. Specifically, we consider the following
trust relationships in which one agent i is considered trustworthy from the viewpoint of
another agent j.
1. T 1 = Tp(p; ph;Mass_Not;Mammo_Req); which means the patient trusts the physi-
cian to request a mammography under the precondition that a suspicious mass is
noticed.
2. T 2= Tp(ph;rg;Cal_Det;Bio_Rec); which means that the physician trusts that the ra-
diologist will recommend a biopsy knowing that the latter has noticed a calcification.
3. T 3 = Tp(p; ph;Rep_Rec;Treat_Plan_Agr); which means that the patient trusts the
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physician to assign a treatment plan under the precondition that the latter has received
the final report.
Below, we present an VISPL fragment for the patient agent declared by means of the
set of her local states and actions, the local protocol, and the local evolution function which
describes how the agent local states evolve. Notice that the vector variables give a particular
agent the possibility to establish the trust towards other agents. For example, we define the
vector V P[3] = fvp0;vp1;vp2g in the local state for the patient agent to allow for the trust
to take place between this agent and the physician agent. We can observe that the value of
V P[0] = vp0 at the local state pat1 is changed to vp1 at the local state pat5 where the
proposition Mass_Not is satisfied in order to make the trust state pat5 accessible from
the trust state pat4.
Agent P a t i e n t
   Beg inn ing of P a t i e n t a g e n t
Vars :
P a t : { pa t0 , pa t1 , . . . . . . . } ;
VP[ 3 ] = { vp0 , vp1 , vp3 } ;    To e s t a b l i s h t h e t r u s t t o w a r d s o t h e r a g e n t s
end Vars
A c t i o n s = { Pa t i en t_Ask_fo r_Exam , . . , P a t i e n t _ n u l l } ;
P r o t o c o l :
P a t = p a t 0 : { Pa t i e n t _Ask_ fo r_Exam } ;
. . . .
O the r : { P a t i e n t _ n u l l } ;
end P r o t o c o l
E v o l u t i o n :
P a t = p a t 1 and VP[ 0 ] = vp0 i f P a t = p a t 0 and A c t i on = Pa t i en t_Ask_ fo r_Exam
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and Envi ronment . A c t i o n = e_Ask_for_Exam ;
. . . .
. . . . .
P a t = p a t 5 and VP[ 1 ] = vp1 i f P a t = p a t 4 and P h y s i c i a n . A c t i on =Mass_Not
and Envi ronment . A c t i o n =e_Mass_Not ;
. . . . . .
end E v o l u t i o n
end Agent
Moreover, in our encoding of the BCDT protocol, we define the atomic propositions
introduced earlier in the Evaluation : : : end Evaluation section. The initial states are inserted
in the InitStates : : : end InitStates section. The formulae presented above are also encoded
and inserted into the Formulae : : : end Formulae section.
3.6.2 Specifications
To verify the correctness of the BCDT scenario at design time, we check the following three
properties: Reachability, Safety, and Liveness. These properties reflect some requirements
of the BCDT protocol that have to be met.
Reachability Property: “Some particular situation can be reached from the initial
states through some computation paths”. For example, whenever the physician detects a
suspicious mass in the patient’s breast, then there exists a possibility for the latter to trust
that the physician will eventually refer her to a radiologist for a mammography. Formally:
f = AG(Mass_Not! EF Tp(p; ph;Mass_Not;AF Mammo_Req)).
Safety Property: “Something bad will never happen”. An example of such a bad
situation is when the physician detects a suspicious mass in the patient’s breast, but the
latter never trusts the former to start the process of requesting a mammography. This bad
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situation can be avoided using TCTL as follows:
f = AG:(Mass_Not ^:Tp(p; ph;Mass_Det;AF Mammo_Req)).
Liveness Property: “Something good will eventually occur”. For example, in all
computation paths, it is always the case that if the radiologist observes a calcification in the
patient’s breast, then eventually in all possible computations, the physician will trust the
radiologist to recommend an appropriate biopsy. This property is expressed as follows:
f = AG(Clac_Det! AF Tp(ph;rg;>;Biop_Rec)).
3.6.3 Verification Results
We check the effectiveness and scalability of the developed algorithms with respect to the
model checking processing time, and to the BDD memory in use. We start by modeling
the BCDT protocol and the formulae to be checked using the introduced VISPL. Then,
we verify such a protocol using our MCMAS-T tool. The experiments are done on a dual
Intel Xeon E5-2643 v2 processor with 32 GB memory. We consider the number of agents
(Agents), the reachable states (States), the execution time in seconds (Time), and the BDD
memory in use (Memory). Specifically, we formalize the protocol in two different ways
(by considering the state space with-loops and without-loops). We evaluate and compare
the explicit state enumeration approach (Algorithm 1), which we call hereafter the direct
technique with the revisited one (Algorithm 3).
Table 3.1: Verification results of the BCDT protocol using the direct algorithm
Agents States Time (sec) Mem.(MB)
6 17 0.111 9
12 289 18.881 30
18 4913 201.313 46
24 83521 6883.12 48
(a) Model with-loop (non-flat)
Agents States Time (sec) Mem.(MB)
6 17 0.093 9
12 289 0.953 15
18 4913 43.191 54
24 83521 1806.45 48
(b) Model without-loop (flat)
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First, we start by presenting the experimental results obtained from the direct ap-
proach (Algorithm 1) using the two different models, with and without-loops. We run our
experiments with a number of agents ranging from 6 to 24. The experiments revealed that
all the tested formulae are satisfied in both models. The verification results for the two mod-
els, with-loop and flat are reported in Table 3.1 - (a) and (b) respectively. We can observe
that the number of reachable states reflects the fact that the state space increases exponen-
tially with the number of agents according to the equation y = e0:4722x. However, the ex-
periments reported that the time increases polynomially with regard to the number of states
in both models. The polynomial equations representing this increase are as follows: y =
5E 07x2+0:0377x+3:5821 for models with loop, and y= 2E 07x2+0:0081x 0:7074
for flat models, which shows that the model checking process is much faster in the flat mod-
els than in the models with-loop. It is also worth noticing that the memory consumption
in both verification results are close to each other, yet some differences can be observed,
caused namely by the internal optimization choices of the BDD-based encoding. There-
fore, although the time increases only polynomially, these results confirmed that the direct
approach is not efficient in practice and not scalable in terms of the number of reachable
states. Even when the model is without-loops, the number of reachable states is still very
limited. As argued earlier, this approach has the disadvantages of enumerating explicitly
all the states in the set X, and has an overhead when we check whether s is different from
s0 or not. These restrictions are the main cause of having the ability to only support a small
number of reachable states with a long verification time and a high memory usage. Yet, this
algorithm is still acceptable for detecting design errors.
Differently from the results presented above, the verification results for model check-
ing using the revisited algorithm (Algorithm 3) are very encouraging in practice. The
experiments revealed that checking flat models is more efficient using this algorithm. Table
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Figure 3.5: Comparison results between models with and without-loops using the direct
algorithm
3.2 shows that the number of reachable states increases exponentially with the number of
agents according to the same exponential equation as for the previous experiment, but the
execution time increases only logarithmically with respect to the number of states following
the equation y = 0:988ln(x)  4:8405, and remains below 13 seconds even for 36 agents.
Moreover, the memory usage is very comparable with the results in Table 3.1. It is clear
that this alternative approach provides better results than the former one. While the first
approach allowed us to verify models up to only 24 agents, this approach is able to check
the same scenario with up to 36 agents. In fact, the performance is more efficient as we
can go further and reach more agents. However, our results are limited to these models
that are without-loops. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the exponential blow-up of the
state space with the number of agents is a classic state explosion problem in MASs and is
independent of our model checking algorithms.
To better highlight the performance variation of the proposed approaches, we present
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Table 3.2: Verification results of the BCDT protocol using the revisited algorithm
Agents States Time (sec) Memory (MB)
6 17 0.09 9
12 289 0.424 15
18 4913 0.991 28
24 83521 4.137 42
30 1.41986E+06 11.971 45
36 2.41376E+07 12.127 39
numerical results in the form of graphs as shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. Figure 3.5 shows
the execution time as function of the number of agents for the direct approach in models
with and without-loops. Figure 3.6 compares the direct and revisited approaches using the
same metric (execution time as function of the number of agents) for the models without-
loops.
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In this chapter, we introduced a new logic for trust with preconditions called Trust Com-
putation Tree Logic TCTL, an extension of CTL that allows us to formally represent and
reason about trust in a system of agents. This chapter has two major contributions. The
first one is the new semantics of trust based on a new trust accessibility relation and a new
vector-based definition of the formalism of interpreted systems. The second contribution
is the algorithms of model checking TCTL and their implementations that result in a new
tool called MCMAS-T along with its vector-based input language VISPL. We introduced
and compared two different model checking algorithms by analyzing two types of models
(models with and without loops). Moreover, we showed by formal proofs that our proposed
logic supports common reasoning rules about trust. We evaluated our approach by means of
a real-life case study in the health-care domain in order to explain our proposed framework
in a practical setting. Our experimental results demonstrated that both developed algorithms
are able to verify TCTL formulae correctly and efficiently.
In the next chapter, we will introduce the notion of conditional trust by extending
the logic of trust TCTL, and we will also examine a different and new model checking





This chapter starts by extending TCTL logic with a new modality for conditional trust to
produce a new logic called TCTLC (Section 4.2). Then, a new model checking framework
for the TCTL logic of preconditional trust that is extended to design a new algorithm to
model check conditional trust TCTLC in MASs is presented. In particular, we introduce
transformation-based algorithms and implemented them in a Java toolkit that automatically
interacts with the NuSMV model checker of the CTL logic in Section 4.3. Our verification
approach automatically transforms the problem of model checking TCTL into the problem
of model checking CTL. Further, we prove that although TCTL and TCTLC extend CTL,
their model checking algorithms still have the same time complexity for explicit models
and the same space complexity for concurrent programs (Section 4.4). In Section 4.5, we
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach by performing a set of experiments
on a widely-used case study in business domain and compare our results with the results
that have been obtained in chapter 3 1.
1The results of this chapter are collected from our publication in [29]
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4.1 An Overview of The Proposed Approach
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Figure 4.1: A schematic view of our TCTL model checking approach
Figure 4.1 illustrates the overall approach of model checking TCTL, which consists
of three integrated phases. In the first phase, we recall the logic TCTL and its formal
model defined using our formalism of vector-extended interpreted systems introduced in
Chapter 3. In the second phase, we introduce our formal verification technique based on
transforming the problem of model checking TCTL into the problem of model checking
CTL along with the complexity analysis of the proposed technique. In the third phase, we
implement our transformation technique in a Java toolkit that automatically interacts with
the NuSMV model checker and report the verification results using a case study.
64
4.2 Conditional Trust TCTLC
In [98], Singh propounds that trust must be conditional, meaning that trust should be ex-
pressed using antecedents and consequents. For example, a customer may trust a merchant
as follows: “if I pay, then I trust the merchant will deliver the goods” [98]. Such a statement
expresses the customer’s expectation and the effect of this expectation on their future plans.
Our preconditional trust modality that assumes the prior satisfaction of the precondition
is different from conditional trust. Expressing conditional trust requires an extension of
TCTL, and to distinguish the two languages, the extended one is called TCTLC. However,
there is a logical relationship between preconditional and conditional trust. In fact, as our
main objective in this chapter is the verification of temporal trust, we will show how this
logical relationship will be exploited to inaugurate a model checking procedure for condi-
tional trust (see Section 4.3.3). The idea we aim to convey is that it is possible to decide
if a given state, and thus a given model, satisfies a conditional trust formula by calling the
model checking of TCTL. To show this, let us first introduce the syntax and semantics of
conditional trust. From the syntax perspective, Tc(i; j;y;j) is read as “agent i trusts agent
j about the consequent j when the antecedent y holds”. It is worth noticing that in the
case of precondition trust, for the trust to take place between the interacting agents i and j,
the condition y ^:j must be satisfied in the current state st to ensure that the precondition
y holds before the trust content j is brought about, while conditional trust requires the ex-
istence of at least one accessible state satisfying the antecedent y . This condition captures
the intuition that the satisfaction of the antecedent is possible in some future. The semantics
of Tc(i; j;y;j) is as follows:
(Mt ;st) j= Tc(i; j;y;j) iff (Mt ;st) j=:j and 9s0t 6= st such that st i! j s0t and s0t j=y ,
and 8s0t 6= st such that st  i! j s0t and (Mt ;s0t) j= y , we have (Mt ;s0t) j= j .
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The non satisfaction of the consequent j complies with the first postulate in [98] stating
that when the consequent holds, the trust in this consequent is “completed and is, therefore,
no longer active”. The following proposition shows the logical link between conditional
and preconditional trust:
Proposition 4.1 (Conditional and Preconditional Trust). Tc(i; j;y;j)^y Tp(i; j;>;y ! j)^
:Tp(i; j;>;:y).
The proof of this proposition is direct from the semantics.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that conditional trust Tc(i; j;y;j) is conceptu-
ally and semantically different from trust about conditions, which can be represented by
Tc(i; j;>;y ! j). An example of the former is "if the buyer i pays the seller j, then i trusts
j will deliver the goods", while for the latter the example is: "the buyer i trusts the seller j
about the fact that, if i pays, then j will deliver the goods" .
Proposition 4.2 (Complexity of the Accessibility Relation). The accessibility relations of
the model Mt can be computed in space O(log2 jAgtj+ log2jMt j)
Proof. Computing the accessibility relation st  i! j s0t given two agents i and j requires
computing the reachability from the state st . The reachability from st is a graph acces-
sibility problem, and it is known by Jones [52] that the problem is in NLOGSPACE, so
it can be done nondeterministically in space O(logjMt j), or, by Savitch’s theorem [95],
deterministically in space O(log2jMt j). Since computing the reachability is independent
from the agents, computing the accessibility for all the agents will require computing the
reachability once, and compare the values of the local vectors for each pair of agents. The
problem of comparing the values of all the pairs is in NLOGSPACE and can be solved non-
deterministicaly in O(log jAgtj) by guessing a pair each time until all the pairs are covered
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Figure 4.2: An example of trust accessibility relation i! j
Figure 4.2 depicts an example of a trust accessibility relation between two states (st
and s0t). In this example, the solid line represents the transition relation from Rt , and the
dashed line represents the direct trust accessibility relation i! j between such states. The
state s0t is compatible with st with regard to the trust the buyer agent has towards the seller
agent. In the figure, we assign a vector to each agent’s local states as follows: nbuyer and
nseller are the vectors of buyer and seller agents respectively. The buyer agent compares the
element of her vector with regard to the seller agent at global states st and s0t . The particular
element value of the buyer agent is the same in both global states (i.e., nbuyer(seller)(st) =
nbuyer(seller)(s0t) = 3).
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4.3 Formal Transformation to Model Check TCTL and
Conditional Trust
In this section, we first introduce a transformation-based approach to address the problem
of model checking TCTL. In a nutshell, given a model Mt representing a trust based MAS
and a TCTL formula j that describes the property that the model Mt has to satisfy, the
problem of model checking TCTL can be defined as verifying whether or not j holds in
Mt , which is formally denoted by Mt j= j . In particular, we apply specific reduction rules to
formally transform the problem of model checking TCTL into the problem of model check-
ing CTL [43]. This provides a way to perform our implementation on NuSMV. Technically,
our transformation method encompasses two stages. First, we apply a set of formal rules
to transform vector-extended transition systems into Kripke structures. Then, we transform
TCTL formulae to CTL ones based on certain rules developed specifically for this purpose.
Such a transformation is performed by developing two formal methods that provide accu-
rate alignments between source and target models, and at the same time preserve TCTL
semantics without losing the validity of the original model properties. This transformation
is then extended to check conditional trust.
4.3.1 Transformation of TCTL Model
In this section, we start by recalling the definition of the CTL model needed for the trans-
formation algorithm.
Definition 4.1. Model of CTL
A CTL formula is interpreted over a Kripke Structure Mc = (Sc;Rc; Ic;Vc), where:
 Sc is a non-empty set of states for the system;
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 Rc  ScSc is the transition relation;
 Ic  Sc is a set of possible initial global states for the system;
 Vc : Sc! 2APc is a labeling function that maps each state to the set of propositional
variables APc that hold in it.
Having presented the CTL model, the next step is to establish our transformation
technique. Given a TCTL model Mt = (St ;Rt ; It ;f i! j j(i; j) 2 Agt2g;Vt), Algorithm 5
shows how this model is transformed into a CTL model Mc = (Sc;Rc; Ic;Vc). The algorithm
takes as input a model Mt (line 1) and outputs the transformed model Mc (line 2). First, the
corresponding model Mc has the same set of system states and initial states (i.e., Sc = St ;
Ic = It). Thereafter, the algorithm initializes the set Rc, and then the set Vc(s) to be equal to
the set Vt(s) (i.e., at the beginning, states are labeled with the same atomic propositions). We
define a new set of atomic propositions needed to represent the trust accessibility relation
to capture the semantics of trust as follows X = fa i jj(i; j) 2 Agt2g. Moreover, we define a
new fresh atomic proposition c that will be used to preserve the actual temporal transition
relation. Thus, the set APc is as follows: APc = X [APt [fcg. The algorithm proceeds
to transform transition and trust accessibility relations to constitute the transition relations
in Rc based on two conditions. The first condition checks if the states st and s0t have a
transition relation in Rt , then this relation becomes a transition relation in Rc (lines 8 &
9). For the second condition, it checks if the current state st has an accessible state s0t
using the accessibility relation i! j for any truster-trustee pair of agents and this state is
different from the state itself, moreover, if the two states are not in Rc, then a new state s00t
is added to the set of system states Sc along with a new transition from the corresponding
st to the corresponding s00t and from s00t to s0t in Rc. Further, the new state s00t is labeled
with the atomic propositions a i j and c in order to distinguish the states that are accessible
from any other next state that satisfies the trust formulae without having accessibility to the
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current state (line 14 & 15). However, if s00t is already added for some other accessibility
relations, we only add the atomic proposition a i j to mark the accessible state for any other
interacting agents (lines 11 & 12). Finally, the algorithm returns the transformed model Mc
after iterating over all the transitions.
Algorithm 5 Transform Mt = (St ;Rt ; It ;f i! j j(i; j) 2 Agt2g;Vt) into Mc = (Sc; Ic;Rc;Vc)
1: Input: the model Mt
2: Output: the model Mc
3: Sc := St ;
4: Ic := It ;
5: Initialize Rc := /0;
6: Initialize Vc(sc) :=Vt(st) for each sc 2 Sc and st 2 St such that sc = st ;
7: for each (st ;s0t) 2 S2t do
8: if (st ;s0t) 2 Rt then
9: Rc := Rc[f(st ;s0t)g;
10: if st  i! j s0t for all (i; j) 2 Agt2 and s0t 6= st then
11: if 9s00t such that ((st ;s00t );(s00t ;s0t)) 2 Rc and c 2Vc(s00t ) then
12: Vc(s00t ) :=Vc(s00t )[fa i jg;
13: else
14: Sc := Sc[fs00t g;




Proposition 4.3 (Boundedness of Model Transformation). jMcj  3jMt j2 where jMt j
(resp. jMcj) is the size of the input model Mt (resp. the output model Mc).
Proof. We have: jMcj = jScj+ jRcj. In the worst case, each pair of distinct states in Mt is
connected by one or many accessibility relations. In this case, the graph of accessibility
relations is complete, so jSt j(jSt j 1) new states and 2jSt j(jSt j 1) new transitions will be
added in Mc. So we obtain, jMcj  jSt j+ jSt j(jSt j 1)+ jRt j+2jSt j(jSt j 1). Consequently,
jMcj  3jSt j2 2jSt j+ jRt j, and thus, jMcj  3jSt j2+ jRt j. The result follows from: 3jSt j2+
jRt j  3(jSt j+ jRt j)2.
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4.3.2 Transformation of TCTL Formulae
This section presents our method to formally transform any TCTL formula j to a CTL
formula f (j) using a recursive transformation function f . The details of this method are
illustrated in Algorithm 6. The transformation of the CTL fragment of TCTL is straightfor-
ward (lines 1-3). Yet, for the temporal operators (lines 4-6), we need to make sure that the
transformation does not affect the CTL semantics. That is, since a new state and new transi-
tions are added to the corresponding model Mc, we have to make sure that the path through
which a formula is satisfied in the original model Mt is still satisfied in the corresponding
path of the translated model Mc. Indeed, this is the main reason behind the conjunction of
:c for the temporal operators. This allows us to exclude the additional state and transi-
tions when we consider the satisfaction of the formulae. For instance, the formula EXj is
transformed into a CTL formula stating that there exist a path in the next state where the
transformation of j and the negation of the atomic proposition c (added to represent the
temporal transition) is true in this state. For the trust modality (line 7), the trust formula
is transformed inductively into CTL according to the defined semantics as follows: the
transformation of the formula y ^:j should hold in the current state, there exists a path
where next state satisfies the added atomic proposition a i j, which captures the existence of
an accessible state, and along each path, if the next state on that path satisfies the atomic
proposition a i j, then the next state of the added state also satisfies the transformation of the
trust content j .
Figure 4.3 depicts an example illustrating the transformation of a TCTL model and
some formulae. On the left side of the figure (part a), the model Mt consists of four global
states s0, s1, s2, and s3. The states s2 and s3 are accessible from s0. Furthermore, the trust
formula (Tp(i; j;y;j)) holds in s0 (i.e., (Mt ;s0) j= Tp(i; j;y;j)). According to the seman-
tics, we obtain (Mt ;s0) j= y ^:j , and there exists a state s0 such that s0 6= s and s i! j s0
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Algorithm 6 Transform TCTL formula j into CTL formula f (j)
1: f (p) = p if p is an atomic proposition;
2: f (:j) = : f (j);
3: f (j _y) = f (j)_ f (y);
4: f (EXj) = EX( f (j)^:c);
5: f (E(j [ y)) = E(( f (j)^:c) [ ( f (y)^:c)) ;
6: f (EGj) = EG( f (j)^:c);
7: f (Tp(i; j;y;j)) = f (y)^ f (:j)^EX(a i j)^AX(a i j! AX f (j));
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Figure 4.3: Example of the transformation methods
, and all the trust accessible states s0 such that s 6= s0 satisfy j (i.e., (Mt ;s2) j= j) and
(Mt ;s3) j= j . Using the proposed transformation technique, the model Mt is transformed
into the CTL model Mc of the right side (part b) as follows: the temporal transitions in Mt
are transformed into transition relations in Mc. Further, the accessibility relations in Mt are
transformed into transition relations in Mc as follows: new states are added to the set of
states in Mc (i.e., s02 and s03 2 Sc) along with new transitions between each two accessi-
ble states and the new states (i.e., (s0;s02), (s02;s2) and (s0;s03), (s03;s3)), and the atomic
propositions a i j and c are added to represent the accessibility relations. Moreover, each
state formula in TCTL is transformed into a CTL formula using the transformation function
f . Thus, the formulae Tp(i; j;y;j) and y ^:j are transformed into f (Tp(i; j;y;j) and
f (y)^ f (:j) in state s0, and for every path, if the next state that satisfies the added atomic
proposition (i.e., the states s02 and s03) is true in this state, then the transformation of the
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trust content j hold as well for all next states.
Proposition 4.4 (Boundedness of Formula Transformation). Let j be a TCTL formula
and f the transformation function defined in Algorithm 6. There exists a constant k such
that j f (j)j< kjjj.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the formula.
 The result holds for the atomic proposition (the base case).
 For the formula f = EXj , we have j f (f)j = j f (j)j+ 4. Therefore, by assumption
that the proposition holds for the formula j , 9k1 such that j f (f)j< k1jjj+4. Since
jjj <jf j, and jf j > 1, we get j f (f)j < (k1 + 4)jf j, so the proposition. The result is
also simlar for the EGj formula.
 For the formula f = E(j [ y), we have j f (f)j = j f (j)j+j f (y)j+ 7. Thus. by
assumption that the proposition holds for the formulae j and y , 9k1;k2 such that
j f (f)j < k1jjj+ k2jyj+ 7. Because jjj <jf j, jyj <jf j, and jf j > 1, we obtain
j f (f)j< (k1+ k2+7)jf j.
 For the formula f =Tp(i; j;y;j), we have f (Tp(i; j;y;j))= f (y)^ f (:j)^EX(a i j)^
AX(a i j! AX f (j)). Thus, j f (f)j= j f (y)j+2j f (j)j+10, and by assumption that
the proposition holds for the formulae y and j , 9k1;k2 such that j f (f)j < k1jyj+
2k2jjj+10. Since jyj<jf j, jjj<jf j, and jf j> 1, we get j f (f)j< (k1+2k2+10)jf j
(i.e., k = k1+2k2+10), so the proposition.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness and Completeness of the Transformation). Let Mt and j be
respectively a TCTL model and formula and let MC and f (j) be the corresponding model
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and formula in CTL. We have (Mt ;st) j=j iff (Mc;sc) j= f (j), where sc is the corresponding
state of st in Mc.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the structure of the formula j .
 For the formula f = EXj , we have (Mt ;st) j= EXj iff there exists an immediate
successor to a state where j holds. Consequently, from the definition of f (Mt) and
f (j), we obtain (Mt ;st) j= EXj iff (Mc;sc) j= EX( f (j)^:c). That is, we are
excluding the new added path as this path will never be considered because next state
(the added state) has c and we are forcing :c .
 For the formula f = E(j [ y), and from the definition of f , ( f (j)^:c) [( f (y)^
:c) captures the semantics of Until in CTL which states the existence of a path
starting in the current state that satisfies (j ^:c) until reaching a state in which
(y ^:c) holds.
 The trust formula: Tp(i; j;y;j). The first and second parts: ( f (y)^ f (:j)) capture
the first condition of the semantics where the current state should satisfy y ^:j .
The third part (EX(a i j)) captures the second condition, i.e., the existence of an ac-
cessible state different from the current state since a i j holds only in such accessible
states. Finally, the fourth part (AX(a i j! AX f (j))) captures the last condition in the
semantics of the trust formula where all accessible states (those satisfying a i j in Mc)
should satisfy j .
4.3.3 Model Checking Conditional Trust
A similar approach to model checking TCTL can be used to model check conditional trust
by transforming the conditional trust formula of TCTLC to a CTL formula as follows:
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f (Tc(i; j;y;j)) = f (:j)^EX(a i j)^AX(a i j! AX( f (y)! f (j)));
In this section, we introduce an alternative solution that uses the developed model check-
ing algorithm of TCTL. The algorithm of model checking conditional trust (Algorithm 7)
capitalizes on the equivalence shown in Proposition 4.1 (line 3). If Tp(i; j;>;y ! j)^
:Tp(i; j;>;:y) does not hold, then updating the evaluation function will be needed. Such
an update works in all cases, but to be more efficient, the algorithm uses it only if the direct
condition (line 3) fails. The update, which also exploits Proposition 4.1, introduces two
fresh atomic propositions: m and k . m holds in the current state (line 4) and in every state
where y holds (line 7). Thus, if Tp(i; j;>;:m) does not hold, which means :Tp(i; j;>;:m)
holds (condition 1), then the only reason is because there is an accessible state different
from the current state where y holds. This is because the first condition in the semantics
of Tp(i; j;>;:m) already holds since m holds in st (line 4). k does not hold in the current
state, but holds in every state where y ! j holds. Consequently, if Tp(i; j;:j;k) holds
(condition 2), then :j holds and all accessible states different from the current state satisfy
y ! j . The algorithm returns true if the two conditions 1 and 2, which correspond to the
semantics of Tc(i; j;y;j), hold (line 9), false otherwise (line 10). Figure 4.4 depicts an
example illustrating Algorithm 7. In this example, the condition of line 3 does not hold
since y does not hold in st . Thus, the model update is required as illustrated in the part (b).
The condition of line 9 holds in the updated model, making the conditional trust formula
Tc(i; j;y;j) true. The following theorem is direct from the semantics of conditional trust
and Proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness and Completeness of Algorithm 7). Algorithm 7 returns true
iff (Mt ;st) j= Tc(i; j;y;j).
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Algorithm 7 Model Check Tc(i; j;y;j)
1: Input: Mt , st , i, j, y , j
2: Output: true if (Mt ;st) j= Tc(i; j;y;j); false otherwise
3: if (Mt ;st) j= Tp(i; j;>;y ! j)^:Tp(i; j;>;:y) then return true;
4: Vt(st) :=Vt(st)[fmg;
5: for all s0t 6= st
6: if (Mt ;s0t) j= y ! j then Vt(s0t) :=Vt(s0t)[fkg;
7: if (Mt ;s0t) j= y then Vt(s0t) :=Vt(s0t)[fmg;
8: end for
9: if (Mt ;st) j= Tp(i; j;:j;k)^:Tp(i; j;>;:m) then return true;
10: return false;
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Figure 4.4: Illustrative example of Algorithm 7
4.4 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we will first analyze the time complexity of model checking TCTL and
conditional trust (TCTLC) with regard to the size of the explicit model Mt and length of the
formula to be checked. Thereafter, we will analyze the space complexity of model checking
TCTL and TCTLC for concurrent programs with respect to the size of the components of
these programs and length of the formula.
As our approach is transformation-based, we start by analyzing the time complexity
of transforming the TCTL model and formula with respect to explicit models, where all
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states and transitions are enumerated. Specifically, we prove that these two transforma-
tions are polynomial with respect to the input TCTL model and linear with respect to the
formula. The polynomial and linear complexity of these two transformations entails the
P-completeness of the TCTL model checking problem in explicit models. Thereafter, we
derive the complexity of TCTLC directly from the one of TCTL. Given that, we proceed
to analyze the space complexity of the TCTL and TCTLC model checking problems and
prove their PSPACE-completeness with respect to concurrent programs where the model
has the form of a synchronized product of agent programs. Indeed, our motivation behind
considering the complexity of our model checking algorithms for concurrent programs that
provide compact representations of the systems to be checked is that in practice, existing
model checking tools (e.g., MCMAS and NuSMV) do not support explicit representations
where states and transitions are listed explicitly (as Kripke-like structures). In fact, only
local states and transitions of each component are represented. Therefore, the actual system
can still be represented by combining local states and transitions to build reachable states.
Theorem 4.3 (Explicit Model Checking TCTL: Upper Bound). The TCTL model check-
ing problem can be solved in time O(jMt j2 jjj) where jMt j and jjj are the size of the
vector-extended model and length of the TCTL formula, respectively.
Proof. TCTL extends CTL, and it is known from [21] that CTL model checking can be done
in a linear time with respect to the size of the CTL model and formula, i.e., O(j f (Mt)j 
j f (j)j). From Proposition 4.3, j f (Mt)j  3jMt j2, i.e., the size of f (Mt) is polynomial
with the size of Mt . Moreover, from Proposition 4.4, the length of f (j) is linear with
the length of j . Indeed, Algorithm 6 takes the TCTL formula j as input and writes in a
recursion manner the corresponding CTL formula according to the structure of j . The time
complexity of transforming the TCTL formula is linear with respect to the length of the
input formula j . This follows from the fact that (1) the length of the recursion is bounded
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by the size of the input formula j , and (2) the size of f (j) is bounded by the size of j , so
the theorem.
Corollary 4.1 (Explicit Model Checking Conditional Trust: Upper Bound). Model
checking conditional trust can be solved in time O(jMt j2 jjj). where jMt j and jjj are
the size of the vector-extended model and length of the conditional trust formula, respec-
tively.
Proof. The result is straightforward for the first method (transformation method) as it is
similar to the model checking of TCTL. For the second solution, Algorithm 7 is simply
calling the model checking of TCTL with an additional update of the model. The result
follows from the fact that the update does not affect the asymptotic size of the model or the
formula, but only adds atomic propositions to some states.
Theorem 4.4 (Explicit Model Checking TCTL: Completeness). The problem of TCTL
model checking is P-complete.
Proof. Membership (i.e., upper bound) in P follows from Theorem 4.3. Hardness (i.e.,
lower bound) in P is a result of the polynomial reduction from model checking CTL proved
to be P-complete in [96].
The following corollary is direct from Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 4.1:
Corollary 4.2 (Explicit Model Checking Conditional Trust: Completeness). The prob-
lem of model checking conditional trust is P-complete.
4.4.1 Space Complexity
In this subsection, we will prove that the complexity of TCTL model checking for concur-
rent programs is PSPACE-complete and so is TCTLC model checking. This result means
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that there is an algorithm solving the problem in polynomial space in the size of the compo-
nents constituting concurrent programs and the length of the formula being model checked.
Concurrent Programs
A concurrent program P as introduced in [61], is composed of n concurrent processes Pi
(modules, protocols, or agents). Each process is described by a transition system Di defined
as follows: Di = (APi;ACi;Si;Di;s0i ;Li), where APi is a set of local atomic propositions, ACi
is a local action alphabet, Si is a finite set of local states, Di SiXACiXSi is a local transition
relation, s0i 2 Si is an initial state, and Li : Si! 2APi is a local state labeling function.
A concurrent behavior of these processes is obtained by the product of the processes
and transition actions that appear in several processes are synchronized by common actions.
The joint behavior of the processes can be described using a global transition system D,
which is computed by constructing the reachable states of the product of the processes and
synchronization is obtained using common action names. This product is the transition
system D = (AP;AC;S;D;s0;L) where:
 AP =Sni=1 APi
 AC =Sni=1 ACi
 S =Õni=1 Si. The ith component of a state s 2 S is denoted by s[i]
 (s;a;s0) 2 D iff:
1. for all 1 i n such that a 2 ACi we have(s[i];a;s0[i]) 2 Di, and
2. for all 1 i n such that a =2 ACi we have s[i] = s0[i]
 s0 = (s01;s02;s03; :::::;s0n)
 L(s) =Õni=1 Li(s[i]) for every s 2 S, where s[i] is the ith component of s
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Theorem 4.5 (Polynomial Reduction of Model Checking TCTL: Upper Bound). Let
vpsrdenote the polynomial-space reduction. The problem of model checking TCTL can be
reduced into the problem of model checking CTL in a polynomial space, i.e., MC(TCTL)
vpsr MC(CTL).
Proof. The transformation of the TCTL model and TCTL formula into the corresponding
CTL model and formula could be computed by a deterministic Turing Machine (T M) in
space O(logn) where n is the size of the input TCTL model, and polynomial space w.r.t. the
size of the TCTL formula. For the model, T M reads in the input tape a model of TCTL and
produces in the output tape, one-by-one, the same states including the initial ones and the
same valuations. Then, for the transitions (st ;s0t) in the input model, it writes one-by-one,
the transitions in the set Rc. Moreover, it reads the accessibility relations  i! j between
two given states in the input model one-by-one and for each one, it adds an intermediate
state to the set Sc labeled with two fresh atomic propositions: 1) a i j that depends on the
accessibility relation, and 2) c , along with two transitions if such a state does not already
exist; otherwise, only the atomic proposition a i j is added. All these writing operations are
clearly logarithmic in space because this transformation is done on-the-fly, step-by-step.
Moreover, we showed in Proposition 4.4 that any TCTL formula is transformable into a
CTL formula whose size is linearly bounded by the size of the input formula. All these
recursive transformations are clearly polynomial space in the length of the input formula,
so the theorem.
Theorem 4.6 (Model Checking TCTL for Concurrent Programs: Completeness). The
space complexity of the TCTL model checking for concurrent programs is PSPACE-complete
with respect to the size of the components of these programs and the length of the formula.
Proof. Since model checking CTL is PSPACE-complete for concurrent programs [96], the
lower bound of model checking TCTL is PSAPCE as well. In fact, TCTL subsumes CTL
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as it integrates the CTL modalities and the trust modality. The upper bound in PSPACE
follows from Theorem 4.5, so the result.
Corollary 4.3 (Model Checking Conditional Trust for Concurrent Programs: Com-
pleteness). The space complexity of model checking conditional trust for concurrent pro-
grams is PSPACE-complete with respect to the size of the components of these programs
and the length of the formula.
Proof. The corollary is direct from Algorithm 7 and Theorem 4.6 since adding atomic
propositions to particular states and calling TCTL model checking with formulae having
linear size with the size of the input formula are not source of additional space complexity.
4.5 Implementation and Experimental Results
4.5.1 Insurance Claim Processing: A Case Study
To illustrate and implement our approach, we use a standard industrial case study [103]. The
case study outlines the process by which auto insurance claims are handled by an insurance
company, AGFIL. There are multiple parties involved in the AGFIL cooperation process:
AGFIL, Policyholder, Europ Assist, Lee Consulting Services, Garage, and Assessor. The
participating parties work together to provide a trusted service which facilitates efficient
claim settlement. The process starts when the policyholder phones the call center Europ
Assist to notify a new claim. Thereafter, Europ Assist registers the information and assigns
an appropriate garage to provide the repair service to the policyholder. It then notifies the
insurance company AGFIL which checks whether the policy is valid or not, and it confirms
the claim coverage. AGFIL then sends the claim details to Lee Consulting Services (Lee
CS) which is responsible for managing the operation of this service. Lee CS normally
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appoints an assessor to conduct a physical inspection of damaged vehicle and checks vehicle
repair estimates with the garage. When repairs are completed, the garage will issue an
invoice to Lee CS which will check the invoice against the original estimate. Lee CS sends
all invoices to AGFIL, which in turn finalizes the payment processes.
This scenario has been formalized, modeled, and verified in terms of commitments for
instance by [28, 9, 56] where the contractual business relationships among the interacting
parties are clearly identified, and also in terms of trust in [98]. Our modeling of trust is
based on the assumption that the trust relationship among the parties involved influences
their decisions without any contractual relationships (commitments) among them.
4.5.2 Implementation
To carry out the experimental process as efficiently as possible, we have developed an
open source java toolkit 2 with a high-degree of automation that interacts automatically
with the NuSMV model checker. Our toolkit essentially consists of two main modules
implementing the proposed transformation algorithms (Algorithms 5,6, and 7). The main
feature of our tool is its ability to automatically transform TCTL models and formulae into
the corresponding CTL models and formulae. Technically, the NuSMV model checker is
used as a core component by the toolkit engine in order to perform the verification aspects.
Our tool takes as input the encoding of the MAS model, analyzes the code with respect
to a set of formulae, and generates the required SMV modules according to the number of
interacting agents. Besides, we implemented lexer and parser that check the syntax of both
TCTL and TCTLC logics.
In our encoding, we formalized the above MAS business scenario using our trust
model Mt associated with the formalism of vector-extended interpreted systems introduced
2The toolkit jar file is available at: https://users.encs.concordia.ca/~bentahar/
TrustJavaToolkit.jar
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Figure 4.5: Screenshot of the generated NuSMV modules and the verification results
earlier in Section 4.3 to formally model the protocol. Thus, we have six interacting agents:
Ins playing the role of AGFIL, PolicyHolder, CallCenter, Repairer playing the role of
Garage, Assessor playing the role of Lee CS, and Adjustor plus the environment agent
that facilitates the communication among these agents. More precisely, we encoded each
agent in our VISPL input language of the MCMAS-T model checker introduced in [32] as
a set of local states and actions, the local protocol, the local evolution function, and the ini-
tial states for each agent. We also considered the accessibility relations between agents by
encoding the vector variables, which give a particular agent the possibility to establish the
trust towards other agents. We validate our modeling using the capability in the MCMAS-
T called Explicit interactive mode which is running the system interactively to
check that it functions as intended. Thereafter, we used our transformation tool to transform
the VISPL encoding model and trust formulae into the SMV model and CTL formulae in
order to be able to start the verification process using the NuSMV model checker. Fig-
ure 4.5 shows the transformation process of the model and formula using our toolkit. Our
toolkit has the capability to scale MASs (scalability button) with respect to a certain
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modeling interleaved technique. In this technique, each agent is paired with another agent
and all the resulting pairs move in a parallel way. Notice from the figure that the left panel
displays the generated NuSMV modules of the MAS business scenario, which indeed is a
CTL model. The Launch NuSMV button runs the NuSMV tool in order to display the
verification results in the right panel of the figure. Furthermore, Time/Formula button
pops up an information dialog box to show the transformation time of each formula (Figure
4.6).
Figure 4.6: Screenshot of the information dialog box that shows the transformation time of
each formula
4.5.3 Properties
In the above scenario, the participating parties have to ensure that the trust relationships
are correctly established on one another to perform their tasks accordingly. To verify the
correctness of the AGFIL scenario at design time, we have to express a set of properties.
We used the safety (something bad will never happen) and liveness (something good will
eventually occur) properties expressed using our logic. Such important properties have been
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widely investigated in different contexts, see for instance [32, 37, 54]. Formally, the safety
property j1 expresses the negation of the bad situation where the insurance company vali-
dates the policyholder claim, but the latter never establishes their trust towards the repairer
with regard to the vehicle repair.
j1 = AG:(validClaim^:Tp(policyholder;Repairer;validClaim;carRepair)).
The liveness property j2 states that in all paths globally, it is always the case that if the
policy holder reports an accident and their claim is valid, then eventually in all future com-
putation paths, their trust towards the insurance company with regard to the claim payment
will take place.
j2 = AG(ReportAccident ^ValidClaim!
AF(Tp(policyholder; Ins;validClaim; insuranceClaimPayment)).
We also checked a liveness property, given by j3, expressed as a conditional trust. The
formula expresses the existence of a computation path where the garage trusts the insurance
company to pay for the repairs once the insurance company accepts the proposed estimate
from the garage.
j3 = EG(Tc(Repairer; Ins;agreeEstimate;RepairPaymentCharge)).
Moreover, we checked in our experiments the existence of some trust relationships in
which one agent i is considered trustworthy from the viewpoint of another agent j. These
relationships are expressed as TCTL properties as follows:
 j4 = EF(Tp(PolicyHolder;CallCenter;reportAccident;gatherIn f o))
 j5 = EF(Tp(Repairer; Ins;repairCar; payRepairCharge))
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The formula j4 expresses the trust relationship between the policy holder and the call-
center, so whenever the former reports an accident, the latter will eventually gather infor-
mation, and the formula j5 states that whenever the garage repairs car, then there exist a
path in its future the trust towards the insurance will take place with regards to the payment.
Indeed, we have verified the above properties in a parametric way in different models hav-
ing different numbers of agents ranging from 7 to 63. For example, the parametric form of





Where the number of agents is 63 agents. The results will be presented and discussed
in the next section.
4.5.4 Experimental Results
The experiments are conducted on AMD FX-8350 - 8 Cores - 4GHZ per core with 32 GB
memory. To test the scalability of our algorithms, we report nine experiments in Table 4.1
for both preconditional and conditional algorithms. We developed a code generation script
that helps us automatically encode different number of agents. We consider the number of
agents (Agents#), the number of reachable states (States#), the transformation times of both
models and formulae in milliseconds, and the average total time calculated based on the
transformation and verification times. The experiments revealed that all the tested formulae
are satisfied in our models. As shown in the table, the number of reachable states reflects
the fact that the state space increases exponentially when the number of agent increases.
Yet, it is clear that the transformation times of both the models and formulae increase only
logarithmically with regard to the number of states. We can also notice that the average total
time increases polynomially with respect to the number of states. Finally, it is worth men-
tioning that the exponential blow-up of the state space with the number of agents is a classic
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state explosion problem in MASs and is independent of our model checking algorithms.
Table 4.1: Verification results of the AGFIL protocol using our toolkit








1 7 42 15 0.8 20
2 14 468 17 0.9 119
3 21 5586 22 1 1330
4 28 67236 36 1.1 8049
5 35 809682 38 1.2 45051
6 42 9.74111e+06 42 1.3 210000
7 49 1.29742e+08 48 1.4 390000
8 56 4.49064e+12 53 1.5 540000
9 63 2.52442e+15 57 1.7 792000
To compare our approach with the model checking approach introduced in [32], we
run the same experiments of the AGFIL scenario using the MCMAS-T model checker with
a different number of agents against the same properties. The experiments revealed that
all the tested formulae are satisfied in the models. Table 4.2 reports the comparison of
the results using the same machine. We can observe that the number of reachable states
increases exponentially with the number of agents as we expected. It is clear that our
transformation-based approach provides better results. An important problem encountered
when running the models with MCMAS-T was that the experiments go down to almost
a halt when we increase the number of agents. That is, while MCMAS-T allowed us to
verify models up to only 42 agents, this approach is able to check the same scenario with
up to 63 agents. In fact, the performance is higher as we go further and reach more agents.
Moreover, the execution time in our approach is also better than the direct approach. We
can observe that in our approach, this metric increases only logarithmically with respect to
the number of states, and remains below 790 seconds even for 63 agents. As compared with
our previous verification technique [32], it is wroth mentioning that the verification results
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for model checking using the transformation tool are more efficient, making it a promising
methodology in practice.
Table 4.2: Comparison of the verification results between Java tool and MCMAS-T
Exp.# Agents# States# Total time
(ms)
1 7 42 20
2 14 468 119
3 21 5586 1330
4 28 67236 8049
5 35 809682 45051
6 42 9.74111e+06 210000
7 49 1.29742e+08 390000
8 56 4.49064e+12 540000
9 63 2.52442e+15 792000
(a) Using our transformation toolkit
Exp.# Agents# States# Time
(ms)
1 7 42 50
2 14 468 1020
3 21 5586 16340
4 28 67236 99723
5 35 809682 694035
6 42 9.74111e+06 3333680
(b) Using the MCMAS-T model checker
Figure. 4.7 compares the verification results of the tool implementing our transformation-
based approach and the MCMAS-T model checker in the form of graph. We use the exe-
cution time as function of the number of agents. By observing the figure, we can readily
conclude that our developed tool is faster than the tool introduced in Chapter 3.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new model checking framework for the TCTL logic of pre-
conditional trust that is extended to design a new algorithm to model check conditional
trust in MASs. We designed transformation-based algorithms and implemented them in a
Java toolkit that automatically interacts with the NuSMV model checker of the CTL logic.
Our proposed technique is able to automatically transform the problem of model checking
TCTL into the problem of model checking CTL. We also discussed the logical relationship
between preconditional and conditional trust, which led to the model checking procedure of
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Figure 4.7: Comparison results between our transformation-based tool and MCMAS-T
conditional trust. The proof of the soundness and completeness of our transformation algo-
rithms is provided. Moreover, we proved that (1) the time complexity of TCTL and TCTLC
model checking in explicit models is P-complete with regard to the size of the model and
length of the formula; and (2) the complexity of the same problems for concurrent programs
is PSPACE-complete with respect to the size of the program’s components. Therefore, our
model checking algorithms have the same complexity as model checking CTL with regard
to both explicit models and concurrent programs. Experiments conducted on a standard
industrial case study demonstrated the efficiency and scalability of the technique. When
we compared our approach with the one proposed in Chapter 3, we reported that the devel-
oped verifier tool was able to verify a variety of formulae correctly and efficiently within
a large case study having approximately 2.52442e+15 reachable states. Thanks to the high
efficiency of CTL model checking to which the model checking of TCTL and conditional
trust is transformed.
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In the next chapter, we will address the quantitative aspects of trust from the logical
and model checking perspectives.
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Chapter 5
Degrees of Trust: Temporal Logic and
Model Checking
Although plenty of qualitative logical frameworks have been proposed to evaluate and
model trust in multi-agent sittings, these approaches generally ignore reasoning about quan-
titative aspects such as degrees of trust. In this chapter, we address this limitation from the
modelling and verification perspectives. In Section 5.2, we start by constructing the Graded
Trust Temporal Logic TCTLG to reason about the qualitative aspect of trust and present a
set of its reasoning postulates. Specifically, we extend TCTL by assigning a weight to the
sets of states that satisfy the trust formula. This allows for computing along a run the ratio
of states where the formula is satisfied. By doing so, degrees of trust would be obtained
from the possible executions of the giving system. Moreover, in Section 5.3, we develop
and implement a new symbolic model checking algorithm and open source tool for quanti-
fying the relationships among the interacting agents. Finally, we investigate the complexity
and evaluate our approach using a case study in the health care domain in Sections 5.4 and
5.5 1.
1The results of this chapter are collected from our publication in [30]
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5.1 An Overview of The Proposed Approach
Qualitative logical frameworks that handle trust in MASs have been widely analyzed in the
literature [32, 87, 49, 83, 18]. Trust in these approaches has often been treated as either true
or false, i.e., we either trust the behavior of an agent or not. However, such systems have
also quantitative temporal properties (such as degrees of trust), which still need further
attention from the logical and model checking perspectives. In fact, in many contexts,
it is quite difficult to determine with absolute certainty whether a proposition about the
behavior of an agent is true or false. For instance, I might trust the agent to a certain degree
in relation to such a proposition (i.e., I may have only 50% of trust). That is, although
qualitative logical formalisms allow us to reason about various classical properties, their
expressiveness is limited in representing some important aspects that deal with the way of
capturing our perception of reality [53].
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Figure 5.1: The main parts of the proposed approach
In fact, a standard approach of trust quantification involves the use of probability
mechanisms accompanied with a representation of agent’s beliefs [51, 78, 86]. However,
it is worth noting that in this thesis we present a different approach that abstracts from the
internal mental states and quantifies trust by relying only on accessibility relations inspired
by the work proposed in [92]. However, unlike [92] that focuses on the degrees of beliefs by
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extending the temporal-epistemic logic CTLK, our work mainly focuses on modeling and
verifying trust by considering a different logic, along with the complexity of its symbolic
model checking. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge and from the formal verification
point of view, there is no model checking tool for verifying systems against graded trust
specifications. Figure 5.1 illustrates our approach.
5.2 Graded Trust Temporal Logic
5.2.1 Syntax and Semantics
In this section, we present the syntax and semantics of TCTLG.
Definition 5.1 (Syntax of TCTLG). The syntax of TCTLG is defined recursively as follows:
j ::= r j :j j j _j j EXj j E(j U j) j A(j U j) j T
T ::= TDkp (i; j;j;j) j TDkc (i; j;j;j)
where r;E;A;X ;_; and U are defined in Definition 2.1 (Chapter 2). The trust operator T
represents the trust relationship between two agents. There are two trust modalities: TDkp
and TDkc , that represent respectively preconditional and conditional graded trust. From the
syntax perspective, TDkp (i; j;y;j) expresses that “the truster i trusts the trustee j to bring
about j given that the precondition y holds with a degree of trust Dk", where k is a rational
number in [0, 1], and D is a relation symbol in the set f;;<;>;=g. While the formula
TDkc (i; j;y;j) reads as “agent i trusts agent j about the consequent j when the antecedent
y holds with a degree of trust Dk". It is worth pointing that the advantage of representing
the trustworthiness of an agent by a single real number format is that it is obvious for an
agent to estimate her degrees of trust and to distinguish between certain agents in order to
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choose the one satisfying their personal expectations. In fact, we can say that when k = 0,
it means the trust has not been achieved, however, when k = 1, the trust has been perfectly
fulfilled. Moreover, when the degree of trust k= 1, the standard trust operators Tp(i; j;y;j)
and Tc(i; j;y;j) can be obtained as abbreviations:
Tp(i; j;y;j) , T1p (i; j;y;j) and Tc(i; j;y;j) , T1c (i; j;y;j).
Definition 5.2 (Semantics of TCTLG). The semantics of TCTLG formulae is interpreted
using a model (MG) generated from Vector-based interpreted systems introduced in Section
3.3 above. Given the model MG, the satisfaction of a TCTLG formula j in a global state s,
denoted as (MG;s) j= j , is recursively defined as follows:
 (MG;s) j= r iff r 2VG(s);
 (MG;s) j= :j iff s 2 j;
 (MG;s) j= j1_j2 iff s j= j1 or s j= j2;
 (MG;s) j= EXj iff there exists a path p starting at s such that p(1)) j= j;
 (MG;s) j= E(j1 U j2) iff there exists a path p starting at s such that for some k 
0; p(k)) j= j2 and 80 i < k, p(i)) j= j1;
 (MG;s) j= A(j1 U j2) iff for all paths p starting at s, there exists some k  0 such
that p(k)) j= j2 and 80 i < k, p(i)) j= j1;
 (MG;s) j= TDkp (i; j;y;j) iff s j= y ^:j and 9s0 6= s such that s i! j s0, and
js i! j s0 : s0 6= s & s0 j= jj
js i! j s0 : s0 6= sj Dk;
 (MG;s) j= TDkc (i; j;y;j) iff s j= :j and 9s0 6= s such that s i! j s0 and s0 j= y , and
js i! j s0 : s0 6= s & s0 j= y ) jj
js i! j s0 : s0 6= sj Dk.
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For atomic propositions, Boolean connectives, and temporal modalities, the relation
j= is defined in the standard manner (see for example [21]). The intuition behind the se-
mantics of TDkp (i; j;y;j) and TDkc (i; j;y;j) is: the degrees of trust that an agent associates
to a formula j in a global state s is the ratio between the number of states s0 distinguishable
and accessible from s and satisfying j (i.e., js i! j s0 : s0 6= s & s0 j= jj), and the total
number of distinguishable and accessible states from s (i.e., js i! j s0 : s0 6= sj).
Example 5.1. We now give examples of natural preconditional and conditional quantita-
tive properties that can be expressed with TCT LG. Let us consider a model for On-line
Shopping System where atomic propositions include Deliver and Pay. Formula (5.1)
specifies that it is not possible, with degree at least 0:95, for the buyer to trust the seller to
deliver the requested items if the payment has not been made.
: EF T0:95c (buyer;seller;:payment;deliver) (5.1)
Formula (5.2) states that the buyer trusts that the seller will deliver the requested items in
75% of the cases under the condition that the latter has already received the payment.
EF T0:75p (buyer;seller; payment;deliver) (5.2)
Figure 5.2 illustrates the model of Formula (5:2).
5.2.2 Reasoning Postulates
We consider in this section several postulates that reflect common reasoning patterns that
are valid in all TCT LG models. These postulates hold for both preconditional and condi-
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Figure 5.2: A model that satisfies the formula (5:2)
we omit i and j in the postulates as far as the truster and trustee are understood, so we simply
write TDk(y;j).
1. TDk1(y;j)) @k2 : TDk2(y;:j)
2. T1(y1;j1)^TDk(y2;j2)) TDk(y1^y2;j1^j2)




The following postulate (4) derives from postulate 3:
4. Tk1(y1;j1)^Tk2(y2;j2)) Tmin(k1;k2)(y1^y2;j1^j2)
5. Tk1(y1;j1)^TDk2(y2;j2)) Tmax(k1;k2)(y1^y2;j1^j2)






11. Tk1(y;j1)_Tk2(y;j2)^: (j1_j2)) Tmin(k1;k2)(y;j1_j2)
12. Tk(y;j1_j2))9k1;k2 s:t: Tk1(y;j1)^Tk2(y;j2)^ k1+ k2  k
13. From Tk(y;j1) and j1 ` j2 and :j2 infer Tk(y;j2)
14. From Tk1(y;j1) and j1 ` j2 and :j2
infer 9k2  k1 s:t: Tk2(y;j2)
5.3 Model Checking TCTLG
Model checking is the problem of automatically establishing whether or not a formula is
satisfied on a given model. In this section, we present an efficient algorithm for the TCTLG
model-checking problem. We start by presenting the main algorithm (Algorithm 8) that
extends the standard symbolic model checking algorithm for CTL [21]. In this algorithm,
we simply call the known procedures for the CTL modalities (i.e., SMCEX , SMCEU , and
SMCAU ) for computing the set of states satisfying the corresponding modalities.
Algorithm 8 works as follows. First, it takes as input the model MG and the TCTLG
formula F and returns the set [[F]] of states that satisfy F in MG. By giving the model MG,
the algorithm recursively goes through the structure of F and constructs the set [[F]] with
respect to a set of Boolean operations applied to sets. The lines 1 to 6 invoke the standard
procedures used in CTL to compute the set of states that satisfy regular CTL formulae. The
lines 7 and 8 call our procedures which compute the set of states that satisfy the graded trust
formulae.
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Algorithm 8 SMC(F;MG): the set [[F]] of states satisfying the TCTLG formula F
1: F is r: return fs 2 SG j r 2VG(s)g;
2: F is :j: return S SMC(j;MG);
3: F is j1_j2: return SMC(j1;MG)[SMC(j2;MG);
4: F is EXj: return SMCEX(j;MG);
5: F is E(j1 U j2): return SMCEU(j1;j2;MG);
6: F is A(j1 U j2): return SMCAU(j1;j2;MG);
7: F is TDkp (i; j;y;j): return SMCTp(i; j;y;j;Dk;MG);
8: F is TDkc (i; j;y;j): return SMCTc(i; j;y;j;Dk;MG);




4: Z Compute the set of states in X1 s.t. their number of accessible states that are in
X2 over the total number of their accessible states - 1 is Dk
5: return Z
5.3.1 BDD-based Algorithm of Graded Trust
This section introduces the model checking algorithms for both the TDkp and T
Dk
c operators.
Given a TCTLG formula F and a TCTLG model MG over the vector-based interpreted sys-
tem, the two algorithms compute the set of states of MG in which F holds. Algorithm 9
describes the procedure SMCTp(i; j;y;f ;Dk;MG). This procedure returns the set of states
in which the preconditional graded trust formula holds. First, the algorithm starts by com-
puting the set Y of states in which the negation of the formula j holds. Afterwards, the
procedure calculates the set X1 (the set of states satisfying y ^:j). Thereafter, it assigns
to the set X2 the set of states where the formula j holds. Thereafter, the algorithm proceeds
to build the set Z by computing the set of states in X1 such that their number of accessi-
ble states that are in X2 over the total number of their accessible states mines 1 satisfy the
appropriate relation Dk. Finally the procedure returns the set Z of the states that satisfy the
formula TDkp (i; j;y;j).
To compute the formula TDkc (i; j;y;j), we follow the same steps in Algorithm 9,
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except lines 2 and 3 which assign to the set X1 the set of states satisfying :j , and to the set
X2 the set of states satisfying y ) j . Indeed, this is based on our proposed semantics of
conditional graded trust where the set of global states satisfying the formula TDkc (i; j;y;j)
in a given model MG is computed by calculating and checking if the ratio between the
number of states satisfying y) j over the total number of all states that can reach and see
such states through the accessibility relation i! j satisfies the appropriate relation Dk.
5.4 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we will show that the complexity of model checking TCTLG is PSPACE-
complete for concurrent programs. Concurrent programs are composed of n concurrent
agents, where each agent is described by a transition system. In these structures, states
and transitions are not listed explicitly, but having instead compact representations that still
correspond to the actual system. In fact, in symbolic model checking, “the Kripke structures
to which model checking is applied are often obtained by constructing the reachability
graph of concurrent programs” [60]. It is worth mentioning that the complexity analysis
only considers the case of flat trust formulae where the content could be any formula but
not a trust one.
To prove the PSPACE-completeness result, we introduce a 2-stage transformation
procedure. In the first stage, we transform the problem of model checking TCTLG into the
problem of model checking ARCCTL1, a new logic that we define in this research. In the
second stage, the problem of model checking this new logic is transformed into the one of
model checking Action-Restricted CTL (ARCTL) proposed in [88]. We will introduce two
transformation functions: f1 for the first stage and f2 for the second stage. Both functions
include rules for transforming the model and formulae from a source language to a target
one. Although a direct transformation from model checking TCTLG into model checking
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ARCTL is theoretically possible in one stage, the 2-stage procedure that uses an interme-
diate language, namely ARCCTL1, makes the transformation more natural and easy to
follow from the methodological perspective.
ARCTL is an extension of CTL with action formulae. We use these actions to capture
the accessibility relations in the original TCTLG model. ARCCTL1 merges a fragment of
the Counting CTL logic (CCTL) [64] with ARCTL. The reason of using ARCCTL1 as
intermediate language for our transformation procedure is that CCTL counts the number of
states satisfying certain sub-formulae along paths and uses this number as a constraint of
the until temporal operator. This allows us to capture the number of accessible states used
to define the semantics of TCTLG. Finally, by merging a fragment of CCTL with ARCTL,
we capture the accessibility relations in the first stage through action-labeled transitions and
use these transitions in the second stage toward the target language ARCTL.
Before introducing ARCCTL1, we briefly review ARCTL [88].
Definition 5.3 (Syntax of ARCTL).
j ::= r j :j j j _j j EaXj j Ea(j U j) j Aa(j U j)
j is a state formula and a is an atomic action formula (a 2 ACA the set of atomic actions).
Instead of considering composed action formulae as in the original ARCTL logic, we only
consider here atomic actions, which are enough to capture the labeled transitions. ARCTL
restricts path quantifiers with an action formulae that must be satisfied along the path (i.e.,
labeling each transition of the path) in order to determine the precise paths over which path
formulae are evaluated.
Definition 5.4 (Model of ARCTL). The model of ARCTL is a tuple MA =(SA;ACA; IA;RA;VA)
where SA is a nonempty set of states; ACA is a set of actions; IA  SA is a set of initial states;
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RA  SAACA SA is a labeled transition relation; VA : SA ! 2AP is a function labeling
states with subsets of atomic propositions AP.
A path of MA is an infinite sequence of states and actions. Pa(s) is the set of paths
(called a-paths) starting at s and where all transitions are labeled with the atomic action a .
The satisfaction relation (MA;s) j= j is given as follows (we omit the semantics of
Boolean connectives and propositional atoms):
 (MA;s) j= EaXj iff there exists a path p 2Pa(s) and (MA;p(1)) j= j;
 (MA;s) j= Ea(j1 U j2) iff there exists a path p 2 Pa(s) such that for some k 
0;(MA;p(k)) j= j2 and (MA;p( j)) j= j1 for all 0 j < k 1;
 (MA;s) j= Aa(j1 U j2) iff for all paths p 2Pa(s) there exists some k  0; such that
(MA;p(k)) j= j2 and (MA;p( j)) j= j1 for all 0 j < k 1.
Definition 5.5 (Syntax of ARCCTL1).





a is an atomic action formula as in Definition 5.3, DK is as in Definition 5.1, and c is
a constraint based on counting the number of states satisfying j (#j) and t is a strictly
positive natural number.
We only use a fragment of CCTL where only one formula (j) is counted in the
constraint through the division operator instead of counting different formulae (ji) and
going through the sum of their corresponding states as in the full CCTL logic. #j captures
the number of states satisfying j along a given prefix and t represents the total number of
states of that prefix (the formal definition will follow).
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ARCCTL1 uses the standard abbreviations. For instance: EaF[c]j = Ea(>U[c] j),
AaF[c]j = Aa(> U[c] j), AaG[c]j = :EaF[c]:j . The size of a formula takes into account





j2)j= jEa(j1 U j2)j+ jjj.
Definition 5.6 (Model of ARCCTL1). ARCCTL1 is interpreted over a labeled Kripke
strcture M = (S;AC; I;R;V) where S is a nonempty set of states; AC is a set of
actions; I is a set of initial states; R  SAC S is a labeled transition relation;
V : S! 2AP is a valuation function.
The satisfaction relation (M;s) j= j is given as follows (we omit the semantics of
propositional atoms, Boolean connectives and the next operator):
 (M;s) j= Ea(j1 U[c] j2) iff there exists a path p 2 Pa(s) such that for some i 
0;(M;p(i)) j= j2 and (M;p(i 1)) j= c and for all 0 j < i, (M;p( j)) j= j1;
 (M;s) j=Aa(j1 U[c] j2) iff for all paths p 2Pa(s), there is some i 0;(M;p(i)) j=
j2 and (M;p(i 1)) j= c and for all 0 j < i, (M;p( j)) j= j1.
where Pa(s) is the set of a paths starting at s, p(i) is the state si of the path p and p(i) is
the prefix s0 : : :si of p . Notice that p( 1) = e is the empty prefix.




over p(i), which is the number of states among s0 : : :si satisfying
j over the size t of the prefix (t = i+1), or formally,
jf jj0 j  i^p( j) j= jgj
i+1
. Notice
that t = 1 when the prefix is empty, which is also the case when the prefix has only one












We proceed now with the first transformation function f1 (i.e., from TCTLG to ARCCTL1).
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Figure 5.3: f1 model transformation from TCTLG to ARCCTL1
order, so we simply need to assume a particular one, for instance: s0;s1; : : : ;sm. Assum-
ing this order, we use the notation: s  i! j (s1;s2 : : : ;sm) to denote s  i! j s1;s  i! j
s2; : : : ;s i! j sm.
The model transformation f1 is as follows: S = SG [ fsnewg; I = IG; Initialize
AC with fa0g and 8s s.t. 9s0 where s i! j s0 add a i js to AC; 8s 2 SG;V(s) = VG(s);
V(snew) = flg; 8(s;s0) 2 RG add (s;a0;s0) to R; and if s i! j (s1;s2; : : : ;sm) then add
f(s;a i js ;s1);(s1;a i js ;s2); : : : ;(sm 1;a i js ;sm);(sm;a i js ;snew)g to R. Figure 5.3 illustrates a
transformation example of this stage.
The formula transformation f1 is defined recursively as follows:
 f1(MG;s) j= f1(r) iff (M;s) j= r;
 f1(MG;s) j= f1(:j) iff (M;s) j= : f1(j);
 f1(MG;s) j= f1(j1_j2) iff (M;s) j= f1(j1)_ f1(j2);
 f1(MG;s) j= f1(EXj) iff (M;s) j= Ea0X f1(j);
 f1(MG;s) j= f1(E(j1 U j2)) iff (M;s) j= Ea0( f1(j1)U f1(j2));
 f1(MG;s) j= f1(A(j1 U j2)) iff (M;s) j= Aa0( f1(j1)U f1(j2));







 f1(MG;s) j= f1(TcDk(i; j;y;j)) iff (M;s) j= f1(:j)^Ea i js F( f1(y))
^ Ea i js XEa i js F
[




All the cases are straightforward, except the trust operators TpDk and TcDk that make use of
the semantics and exploit the constrained until operator of ARCCTL1 from the next state.
This operator counts the number of states satisfying the content f1(j) or the condition
f1(y ) j) over the total number of states in the prefix starting from the next state to
the last state preceding the state satisfying l , which means the newly added state. This
prefix corresponds to the accessible states from s, which are captured through the transitions
labeled by a i js . For the TcDk operator, y should be satisfied in one of the accessible states,
which means in one of the future states through an a i js path, i.e., Ea i js F( f1(y)).
For the second stage transformation f2 (i.e., from ARCCTL1 to ARCTL), the model
transformation is straightforward; it is a simple mapping of each element of M to the
corresponding element of MA. The formula transformation is given in Function f2(F:
ARCCTL1). To transform the constrained until operator over a certain path (Function
TransEU ), the function computes ÕE(j1Uj2), the set of prefixes of paths satisfying the for-
mula E( f2(j1) U f2(j2)). If one of these prefixes satisfies the constraint in terms of the
number of states jSUj j over the size of the prefix, the unconstrained until formula is returned.
Otherwise, the formula cannot be satisfied, so false is returned instead. The case of the uni-
versal constrained until is similar (Function TransAU ). The following theorem holds. It can
be proved by induction over the structure of the formula j .
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness and Completeness of the Transformation).
1. (MG;s) j= j iff (M;s) j= f1(j);
2. (M;s) j= j iff (MA;s) j= f2(j);
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Function f2(F: ARCCTL1): ARCTL formula
1: switch (F):
2: case r : return r;
3: case :j : return : f2(j);
4: case j1_j2 : return f2(j1)_ f2(j2);












j2) : return TransAU (j1;j2;j;Dk);
8: end switch
Function TransEU (j1;j2;j;Dk): ARCLT formula
1: if Ea( f2(j1)U f2(j2)) =? then return false
2: else
3: Compute ÕE(j1Uj2)
4: Sj := fj 2 Sjj j= f2(j)g
5: for each PE(j1Uj2) 2ÕE(j1Uj2)




Dk then return Ea( f2(j1)U f2(j2))
8: end for
9: return false
Proposition 5.1. Let MC(L ) be the problem of model checking the language L for con-
current programs andp be the polynomial-space reduction. We have MC(ARCCTL1)p
MC(ARCTL).
Proof. Regarding the model, it is easy to see that any model of ARCCTL1 is also a model
of ARCTL. So, we can easily imagine a deterministic Turing machine TM that can compute
the model reduction in space O(logn) where n is the size of the input ARCCTL1 model.
In fact, TM simply looks at the input and writes in its output tape, one by one, the states
(including the initial ones), the actions, labeling functions, and transitions. With regard to
the formula, for the 4 first cases of the function f2, it is easy to see that the transformation
is polynomial in the size of the input formula. For the 5th and 6th cases, we need to store
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Function TransAU (j1;j2;j;Dk): ARCLT formula
1: if Aa( f2(f1)U f2(f2)) =? then return false
2: else
3: Compute ÕA(j1Uj2)
4: Sj := fj 2 Sjj j= f2(j)g
5: for all PA(j1Uj2) 2ÕA(j1Uj2)




6D k then return false
8: end for
9: return Aa( f2(j1)U f2(j2))
the sets ÕE(j1Uj2), ÕA(j1Uj2) and Sj , which are all logarithmic in the size of the input
model and formula. In fact, the transformation function f2 is recursive and the depth of the
recursion is bounded by the length of the input formula.
Theorem 5.2. MC(ARCCTL1) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The lower bound (i.e., PSPACE hardness) follows from the fact that MC(CTL) p
MC(ARCCTL1) and MC(CTL) is PSPACE-complete [60]. Since MC(ARCTL) is also
PSPACE-complete [57], the upper bound follows from Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.2. Let Mod(L ) be the model of the language L and log denote the log-
space reduction. We have Mod(TCTLG)log Mod(ARCCTL1).
Proof. We show that the model reduction from TCTLG to ARCCTL1 presented above can
be computed by a deterministic Turing machine TM in space O(log(jMod(TCTLG)j)). TM
reads in the input tape a model of TCTLG and generates in the output tape, one by one,
the same states with the same state ordering, the same state labeling function, the same
transitions as the input after labeling them with a0 and writing a0 in the set of atomic
actions ACA, and an additional state snew to which it associates the last ordering rank with
a unique label l . For each state s and each pair of agents (i; j), TM reads the accessibility
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relations  i! j from this state one by one in a sequential way in the same order of the
accessible states, adds a i js to the set ACA and adds transitions labeled by a
i j
s , first from s
to the first accessible state, then between each two adjacent accessible states according to
their order, and finally from the last accessible state to the newly added state snew. Thus,
to transform the accessibility relations, we only need to record 3 states at each moment of
time: the original state s, the current accessible state, and the last accessible state to which
a transition labeled by a i js has been added. Since all these operations can be be done in a
logarithmic space in the size of the input model, we are done.
Proposition 5.3. MC(TCTLG)p MC(ARCCTL1)
Proof. The model part is proven in Proposition 5.2. For the formula, we need to show
that j f1(F)j is polynomial in the length of the ARCCTL1 formula F. We prove this by
induction over the structure of F. The proposition holds for the atomic case, and we have:
j f1(:j)j = 1+ j f1(j)j; j f1(j1 _j2)j = 1+ j f1(j1)j+ j f1(j2)j; j f1(EXj)j = 2+ j f1(j)j
(note that ja0j = 1); j f1(E(j1Uj2))j = 2+ j f1(j1)j+ j f1(j2)j; j f1(A(j1Uj2))j = 2+
j f1(j1)j+ j f1(j2)j; j f1(TDkp (i; j;j1;j2))j= 7+ j f1(j1)j+2j f1(j2)j; j f1(TDkc (i; j;j1;j2))j=
10+ 2j f1(j1)j+ 2j f1(j2)j. Thus, if the proposition holds for j , j1, and j2, then it holds
for f1(:j), f1(j1_j2), f1(EXj), f1(E(j1Uj2)), f1(A(j1Uj2)), f1(TDkp (i; j;j1;j2)) and
f1(TDkc (i; j;j1;j2)).
Theorem 5.3. MC(TCTLG) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The lower bound follows from the polynomial-space reduction from MC(CTL)
proven to be complete for PSPACE [60]. The PSPACE upper bound follows from Proposi-
tion 5.3 and Theorem 5.2.
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5.5 Implementation and Experiments
We implemented our algorithms on top of MCMAS [73]. One of the appealing features of
MCMAS-G, our new open source model checker, is the ability to provide the validation by
means of a graphical user interface that is based on Eclipse to generate counterexamples and
witnesses for several classes of TCTLG formulae. The toolkit modeling language is VISPL
[32], which is a simple description of the states and transitions in a model embedded with
the vector-based semantics. The source and executable files of the resulting toolkit are
available online at
In the following section, we consider the Breast Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment
(BCDT) protocol as an illustrative application example introduced in Section 3.4.1 to show
how our model checking technique can efficiently be applied on a medical health care plat-
form to check the trust transactions against some quantified temporal trust conditions.
5.5.1 Performance Evaluation
We use our formal model MG associated to the vector-based interpreted systems introduced
earlier in Section 3.3 to formally model the BCDT protocol. According to this protocol,
five parties are involved in the cancer diagnosis process, which are: patient denoted by
Pa, physician (Ph), pathologist (Pt), radiologist (Rd), and registrar (Rg). Moreover, an
environment agent e is added to model the BCDT process. In this scenario, the graded
trust relationships between the participating parties express the system requirements that
regulate the interacting agents. Such requirements are specified using our graded logic of
trust TCTLG. Indeed, trust relationships among parties evolve with interactions, and the
following atomic propositions represent potential states in the evolution of these relation-
ships: MassDetected for mass noticed, MammoRefered for mammography referral,
Cal_Det for calcification detected, Biop_Rec for biopsy recommended. Moreover, the
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atomic propositions, TreatmentPlanAgreed, ReportReceived, TissueReceived,
TissueAnalyzed, and ResultsAccommodated. The involved parties must have the
possibility of reaching states in which some of these propositions hold. Thus, the trust re-
lationships are instantiated and help prospective agents decide how much should they trust
other agents.
The following protocol properties are expressed in the TCTLG logic to check the
correctness of the process model.
f1 = EF T p0:75(Pa;Ph;MassDetected;MammoRe f ered)
f2 = EF T0:95c (Pa;Ph;MassDetected;AF MammoRe f ered)
f3 = EF :T0:5c (Rd;Pt;TissueReceived;TissueAnalyzed)
f4 = AG (ResultsAccommodated)
EF T0:75c (Pa;Ph;ReportReceived;AF TreatmentPlanAgreed))
f5 = AG(Clac_Det) AF T0:75p (Ph;Rd;>;Biop_Rec))
These formulae express reachability and liveness properties for both preconditional
and conditional trust. For example, the formula f1 encodes the fact that there exists a state
reachable from the initial state, such that the Patient trusts the Physician to refer her to a
radiologist for a mammography upon he detects a suspicious mass with a degree  0:75.
The formula f2 states that whenever the physician detects a suspicious mass in the patient’s
breast, then in all future computations, the latter trusts that physician to eventually refer
her to a radiologist for a mammography with a degree at least 0:95. Moreover, in terms
of liveness property, f5 states that in all computation paths, it is always the case that if the
radiologist observes a calcification in the patient’s breast, then eventually in all possible
computations, the physician will trust the radiologist to recommend an appropriate biopsy
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with a trust degree more than 0:75.
5.5.2 Experimental Results
In order to assess the scalability of our technique and implementation, we measured the
model checking processing time to construct the model and the BDD memory usage to
successfully perform the verification task when running on a machine Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-6700 CPU - 3.40GHZ with 16 GB memory. We run our experiments with a number of
agents ranging from 6 to 30. Our motivation of considering different number of agents is
to achieve different levels of scalability that makes the problem complex enough to observe
significant results. The experiments revealed that all the tested formulae are satisfied. Table
5.1 recorded the verification results along with the number of agents and the reachable
states in the model constructed. We can observe that the number of reachable states reflects
the fact that the state space increases exponentially with the number of agents. It is also
worth noticing that the memory consumption increases polynomially, which confirms the
PSPACE-completeness result. However, the program timed out when the number of agents
exceeds 30. Yet, it is still acceptable for detecting design errors in scalable models. In
fact, we are unable to provide a full comparison of these results to other implementations
as, to the best of our knowledge, there is no model checker tool that can be used to verify
properties of quantified trust as we do in this work.
Table 5.1: Verification results of the BCDT protocol against TCTLG formulae
Exp# Agents# States# Time (sec) Mem.(MB)
1 6 19 0.098 10
2 12 361 1.114 16
3 18 6859 26.13 45
4 24 117325 1614.5 48
5 30 2.00752e+06 57646 65
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced TCTLG, a logical language that extends the Trust Computa-
tion Tree Logic TCTL to formally represent and reason about the quantitative aspect of trust
in MASs. We assigned a weight to the sets of states that satisfy the trust formula. Thus, the
degrees of trust can be obtained from the possible executions of the giving system. More-
over, we presented a model checking algorithm for TCTLG that extends the CTL symbolic
algorithm and its implementation that results in a new open source tool called MCMAS-G.
Moreover, we proved through a 2-stage transformation procedure that the complexity of
TCTLG symbolic model checking for concurrent programs is PSPACE-complete with re-
spect to the size of the program’s components. We evaluated our approach by means of a
real-life case study in the healthcare domain in order to explain our proposed framework in
a practical setting. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical space complexity.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Directions
This chapter gives a summary of the main contributions of the thesis. First, it presents
the answer to our research questions, the concepts that we introduced, and the results that
we obtained. Then, a sketch of possible extension of this work and the open questions
remaining are stated .
6.1 Summary
Agents in an open environment are interacting with each other for different reasons in or-
der to meet their goals. Model checking trust in MASs at design stage, to have confidence
that the system will work as desired, is a challenging issue. While the number of propos-
als on trust modeling is significant, they differ, however, in the topics they addressed and
the systems they implemented. In this thesis, we were primarily concerned with the issues
of reasoning about and verifying trust in the context of MASs using the model checking
approach, which has not been deeply investigated yet for trust systems. Differently from
existing definitions in the literature, in this thesis, we considered a cognitive-independent
view of trust where trust ingredients are seen from a non-epistemic angle. Trust in our work
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is defined from a high-level abstraction perspective without having to depend on individual
agents’ internal states. We presented trust as a direct relation from one agent, the truster,
toward another agent, the trustee, where such a relation presupposes specific conditions
with respect to a particular content. Indeed, we have put forward a new logical frame-
work for trust-based MASs to enable trusted agent interactions in open, heterogeneous and
autonomous systems. In particular, we addressed the semantics, model checking, and com-
plexity challenges. We conducted an in-depth literature review to guarantee the originality
of our work and its effectiveness in filling the state-of-the-art research gaps. The framework
consists of different components that are mainly introduced in three chapters. Chapters 3
and 4 revolved around our first three research questions and chapter 5 answered our last
research question. In chapter 3 and from the modeling and specification perspectives, we
achieved our goal of presenting the Trust Computation Tree Logic (TCTL), an extension
of the CTL logic [43] to formally represent and reason about trust in a system of agents.
Equipped with the presented reasoning postulates, TCTL does not only provide a formal
basis for reasoning about trust states with preconditions, but it can also be seen as a for-
mal modeling of the social trust interactions among agents. A major contribution of our
approach is the new provided semantics of trust based on a new trust accessibility relation,
which has not been addressed in the existing approaches. In particular, we provided an
intuitive and grounded computational semantics based on a new vector-based definition of
the formalism of interpreted systems. We were able to formally specify and automatically
verify trust-based interactions among autonomous agents. A further novelty is the develop-
ment of new model checking algorithms dedicated to the proposed logic (TCTL) and their
implementations that result in a new tool called MCMAS-T along with its vector-based
input language VISPL. We investigated the most intuitive and efficient algorithm for com-
puting the trust set by introducing and comparing two different model checking algorithms
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and analyzing two types of models (models with and without-loops).
In Chapter 4, we first extended the TCTL language with a modality to describe con-
ditional trust. The specificity of this modality is its compatibility with the literature where
trust is dealt with as conditional, meaning that trust should be expressed using antecedents
and consequents. By doing so, a new language called TCTLC is presented. Then, we in-
vestigated a different model checking technique to verify preconditional and conditional
trust. In particular, we developed a new model checking framework for the TCTL logic of
preconditional trust that is extended to design a new algorithm to model check conditional
trust in MASs. We applied a set of formal rules to transform vector-extended transition
systems into Kripke structures. Then, we transformed TCTL formulae to CTL ones based
on certain rules developed specifically for this purpose. Such a transformation is performed
by developing two formal methods that provide accurate alignments between source and
target models, and at the same time preserve TCTL semantics without losing the validity
of the original model properties. Our main challenge here was to make sure that the path
through which a formula is satisfied in the original model TCTL is still satisfied in the cor-
responding path of the translated CTL model. Moreover, to perform this transformation, we
developed a Java toolkit that automatically interacts with the NuSMV model checker of the
CTL logic. The proof of the soundness and completeness of our transformation algorithms
is provided. Furthermore, we proved that (1) the time complexity of TCTL and TCTLC
model checking in explicit models is P-complete with regard to the size of the model and
length of the formula; and (2) the complexity of the same problems for concurrent programs
is PSPACE-complete with respect to the size of the program’s components. Therefore, our
model checking algorithms have the same complexity as model checking CTL with regard
to both explicit models and concurrent programs. Experiments conducted on a standard
industrial case study demonstrated the efficiency and scalability of the technique. When we
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compared this approach with the results proposed in Chapter 3, we reported that the devel-
oped verifier tool was able to verify a variety of formulae correctly and efficiently within
a large case study having approximately 2.52442e+15 reachable states. Thanks to the high
efficiency of CTL model checking to which the model checking of TCTL and conditional
trust is transformed.
In Chapter 5, we introduced TCTLG, a logical language that extends the Trust Com-
putation Tree Logic TCTL to formally represent and reason about the quantitative aspect
of trust in MASs. One of our main challenges here was the weight that we assigned to the
sets of states that satisfy the trust formula. Thus, the degrees of trust can be obtained from
the possible executions of the giving system. Moreover, we presented a model checking
algorithm for TCTLG that extends the CTL symbolic algorithm and its implementation that
results in a new open source tool called MCMAS-G. We proved through a 2-stage transfor-
mation procedure that the complexity of TCTLG symbolic model checking for concurrent
programs is PSPACE-complete with respect to the size of the program’s components. We
evaluated our approach by means of a real-life case study in the healthcare domain in order
to explain our proposed framework in a practical setting. The experimental results con-
firmed the theoretical space complexity.
6.2 Future Directions
Despite the fact that we successfully applied our specification languages and their model
checker tools to different application domains, we believe, based on our literature reviews,
that the following few points are worth investigating in the future:
 There is a need to tackle the runtime verification problem to investigate the dynamic
changes of agents’ behavior and their impact on trust. Perhaps this is an issue that we
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see emerging in our approach. We believe that model checking and runtime verifica-
tion can be integrated in a unified framework to verify trust-based MASs.
 Trust and commitments are two independent concepts. However, in concrete applica-
tions such as business interactions, there exist situations where performing trust and
commitment scenarios contribute towards improving the efficiency of MASs. Indeed,
trust provides a complementary aspect to commitments (i.e., trust and commitment
are correlated to each other). In this thesis, we made a first step toward modeling the
trust from a high level abstraction perspective. Further efforts are needed to induce
commitments that would support trust by exploring the interaction between trust and
social commitments from the specification and model checking standpoints.
 We noticed a strong connection between trust and reputation in social settings. Con-
sequently, we would like to combine our formalism by defining a suitable semantics
for the notion of reputation along with the associated model checking algorithm. This
is extremely important to show how reputation can be exploited by an agent to build
its trust degree in other agents.
 Considering the degree of confidence that an agent has in its trust value and incorpo-
rating this degree in our logic are interesting issues for future investigation.
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